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ABSTRACT: The mother lode of criminal law
scholarship is a unitary theory of excuses, that is, a
normative account as to why a person who engages in
conduct that a criminal statute prohibits ought
nevertheless not be blamed for it. After defining
Aexcuse@ against commentators who argue that it
cannot be coherently defined, and after criticizing
competing theories of excuse, I argue that the feature
that renders persons normatively blameless -- and,
typically, legally blameless, too -- for engaging in
conduct that a criminal statute prohibits is the
possession of a certain attitude with which he engages
in it. A person is normatively blameless if, despite
engaging in conduct that a statute prohibits, he was
motivated by proper respect for interests that the
statute seeks to protect.
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AN ATTITUDINAL THEORY OF EXCUSE
The mother lode of criminal responsibility scholarship is a
unitary theory of criminal excuses, that is, a persuasive normative
account of why the criminal law adjudges actors to be blameless
despite their having committed criminal wrongs.1
The law=s other criminal defenses do not readily lend
themselves to unitary normative accounts or, if they do, rest on
normative accounts that are self-evident. Consider what Paul
Robinson aptly calls Anon-exculpatory@ defenses,2 that is, defenses like
double jeopardy and diplomatic immunity that bar actors from being
tried for reasons that are independent of whether or not they engaged
in the blameworthy conduct with which they are charged. Individual
non-exculpatory defenses such as double jeopardy may be difficult to
explicate, but double jeopardy and diplomatic immunity share
nothing normative in common, except that, like all non-exculpatory
defenses, they bar actors from being tried and convicted. Consider,
too, a defendant who denies that he committed the actus reus of a
charged offense or who claims that, if he committed it, he did so
because it was the lesser of two evils and, hence, justified. Unlike
See Michael Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, in PLACING BLAME 548
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ____)(A[Excuses are the royal road to theories
of responsibility generally@). For others who have proposed theories of excuse,
see Richard Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, in J. PENNOCK AND J.
CHAPMAN, EDS., NOMOS: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 165 (New York: New York
University, 1985); Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses,
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465 (1991); Joshua Dressler, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW ' 17.03 (3d ed., New York: Lexis Publishing, 2001); Claire
Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 317
(2002); George Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 798-817 (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1978); John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 575
(1998); H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 28 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); Sanford Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257 (1987); Paul Robinson, Excuses, in STRUCTURE
AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 81-94 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997); Robert Sullivan, Making Excuses, in A. Simester & A. Smith, eds., Harm
and Culpability ____ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); George Vuoso,
Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 (1987); Glanville
Williams, The Theory of Excuses, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 732.
2
See Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 71-77.
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non-exculpatory defenses, these are Aexculpatory defenses@ because
they deny that the defendant engaged in conduct that was
blameworthy. Nevertheless, actus reus defenses rest on unitary norms
that are transparent -- namely, that all things considered, the
defendant did nothing that the applicable criminal law regards as an
undesirable or regrettable thing for an actor to do under the
circumstances.
Like the aforementioned defenses of actus reus and
justification, excuses are also exculpatory defenses; for they, too, deny
that those who invoke them engaged in conduct that is blameworthy.
Yet unlike defenses of lack of actus reus and justification, excuses
obtain even when a defendant has done something that society
regards as undesirable or regrettable under the circumstances.
Indeed, defendants may engage in the most heinous conduct and
nevertheless possess excuses. Recall John W. Hinckley. Hinckley
loaded his .22 caliber pistol with so-called ADevastator@ bullets which
explode on contact and shot at President Ronald Reagan six times,
grievously wounding Reagan and two of his security personnel and
inflicting permanent brain damage on White House Press Secretary,
James Brady.3 The federal statutes that make it a crime to assassinate
the President are designed to prevent precisely such conduct, and the
heinousness of what Hinckley undertook would have justified the
Secret Service in killing him to prevent it. Nevertheless, Hinckley
possessed a defense of insanity that excused him from being
condemned and punished for the heinous thing he did.
Insanity is one of several excuses that criminal codes typically
provide, including (but not limited to) involuntariness, immaturity,
involuntary intoxication, and mistakes of fact and law. The question
for criminal law scholars is whether these excuses are predicated on a
unitary normative principle and, if so, what the principle is. The
question is important because if such a principle exists and can be
identified, it can serve as a normative guide to jurisdictions in
deciding how broadly or narrowly to enact and construe excuses in
areas in which their existence or scope is contested. The question is
See generally Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense and the Trial of John W.
Hinckley (New York: Dell, 1987).
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also fundamental because to understand when some actors ought to
be excused is, ultimately, to understand when other actors are
blameworthy.
Now some commentators deny the possibility of a theory of
excuses as such because they deny any distinction between excuses
and justifications.4 Other commentators believe that theories of
criminal excuse are ultimately derivative of theories of punishment
itself,5 leaving the former just as normatively contestable as the latter.
Still others claim to have identified a workable theory of excuses, e.g.,
that actors are excused for engaging in regrettable conduct when they
have no Achoice@ or Acontrol@ to act otherwise than they do.6
I believe these views are mistaken. The difference between
justification and excuse, properly understood, is as basic and simple as
the difference between, AI did nothing wrong,@ and AEven if I did, it
was not my fault.@ Theories of excuse do not presuppose theories of
punishment, provided that it is agreed that the state ought not to
declare things to be true that it knows to be false. Existing theories of
excuse are not able to account for what they include as Aexcuses,@
and they are not able to distinguish what they exclude as nonexcuses.
Part I defines Aexcuse,@ and it does so by distinguishing it from
Ajustification@ and defenses of actus reus. Part II responds to
commentators who deny that excuse is a moral category that can be
meaningfully distinguished from justification. Part III addresses
several contending definitions and normative accounts of Aexcuse.@
Part IV advances a normative account of excuses based upon the
normative predicates of speech-acts of reproach. To reproach a person
for conduct is to express the belief that he acted with a reprehensible
attitude toward the legitimate interests of himself or others. Just as a
state ought not to reproach persons for acts that they do not commit,
a state ought not to reproach persons for acts that do not manifest
reprehensible attitudes toward themselves or others.
See notes ____, infra.
See Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, pp. 169-71; Corrado, Notes on
the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, pp. 470-71.
6
See notes _____, infra.
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I. A DEFINITION OF AEXCUSE@

All theories of excuse are normative accounts regarding when
actors ought to be excused for engaging in prohibited conduct, and, as
such, they presuppose a definition of that for which they claim to
account -- namely, Aexcuses.@ Suppose, for example, that two
commentators each set out to rationalize excuses, one of whom
understands excuses to encompass non-exculpatory defenses like
double jeopardy, and the other of whom does not. These respective
commentators produce different theories of excuse because they begin
from different starting points as to what counts as an Aexcuse.@ To
assess the normative significance of their respective theories, one must
assess their classifications of defenses, including their definitions of
Aexcuse.@ I shall argue that excuses are best understood in
relationship to two other exculpatory defenses, namely, lack of actus
reus and justification.
There is extensive literature on distinctions between excuse
and justification, some of it quite critical of the distinction. It is a
mistake, however, to begin an exposition of excuse by juxtaposing it
to justification because justification is itself a contested category.
Instead, therefore, we shall start with a category of exculpatory
defenses that is easily understood and non-controversial, i.e., the
claim by a defendant that he did not commit the actus reus of the
charged offense. With the latter defense thus firmly in mind, I will
argue that Ajustification,@ as I define it, is a set of exculpatory defenses
that derive from the same principle as that which underlies the actus
reus defense but that come into play only where actus reus defenses are
unavailing -- namely, where the commission of the actus reus of an
offense is regarded in law as no greater a legal evil than the alternative
evil an actor would have to choose under the dilemmatic
circumstances in which he finds himself. I will conclude by arguing
that Aexcuses@ are nothing but the residual set of exculpatory defenses
to wrongdoing that exist in law over and above defenses of actus reus
and justification are fully accounted for.
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Before proceeding, however, I should clarify what I mean by
criminal Adefenses.@ I use Adefense@ broadly to refer to all claims to
the effect that, given such evidence as is otherwise admissible and
given such burdens of proof as otherwise apply, the state may not
lawfully try and/or convict a defendant of an offense at issue.
Accordingly, I do not use Adefense@ to refer to exclusionary rules
regarding the admissibility of real or testimonial evidence; nor do I use
Adefense@ to refer solely to claims upon which the defense has
burdens of proof; nor do I use it to refer to claims that come into play
after the elements of an offense have been established. I will speak of
Adefenses@ of lack of actus reus and lack of mens rea and Adefenses@ of
justification, even though the prosecution invariably has burdens of
persuasion with respect to the former and the defense often has
burdens of persuasion with respect to the latter.
A. The Defense of Lack of Actus Reus
Every criminal statute contains both an actus reus and, unless
it is a strict liability statute, mens rea as well. The Aactus reus@ of an
offense is conduct that the statute prohibits, regardless of mental
states with which the conduct may otherwise be done. AConduct,@
whether in the form of an action or omission,7 is any harm or risk for
which an actor is a but/for cause, or any undertaking that goes beyond
Amere thoughts@ by which a person actualizes his purposes in the
world. Typically, the conduct constituting the actus reus is prohibited
because it represents a harm or risk that the state seeks to prevent.
Consider a murder statute that makes it a crime if a person
Aunlawfully and with malice aforethought causes the death of another
human being@8 (while using the term Aunlawfu[l]@ to refer to killings
that are unjustified evils under the circumstances). Obviously, a
An Aaction@ is the conduct of producing a certain regrettable state of affairs
by altering such events as would otherwise occur, e.g., a motorist=s causing a
pedestrian=s death by hitting the pedestrian in a crosswalk. An Aomission@ is the
conduct of producing a certain regrettable state of affairs by refraining from
arresting such events as occur, e.g., a passing motorist=s causing a mortallywounded pedestrian=s death by refraining from calling an ambulance.
8
See, e.g., 21 Oklahoma Statutes ' 701.7 (2003).
7
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person is guilty under the statute only if he does all of what the
statute specifies as a condition of liability, including acting with the
mens rea of Amalice aforethought.@ However, the actus reus of the
offense consists of only a portion of what the statute specifies as
conditions of liability. The actus reus of murder consists of conduct
that the state regards as regrettable even if it is inflicted by actors
without malice aforethought or without any guilty mind for that
matter -- namely, the conduct of Aunlawfully . . . caus[ing] the death
of another human being.@
The conduct that murder statutes prohibit is regrettable
because it is a material harm. Indeed, the material harm upon which
murder statutes are predicated, i.e., unlawful homicide, is regarded in
law as so fearsome that murder is the only offense for which the U.S.
Supreme Court has allowed the death penalty.9 Not all criminal
offenses, however, are predicated on material harm. Many offenses
are predicated on conduct that the state regards as regrettable
because of the risks of material harm it presents. Consider the
unlawful possession or sale of drugs. In themselves, acts of unlawfully
possessing or selling drugs inflict no harm that the state wishes to
prevent, provided the acts do not lead to the unlawful ingestion of
drugs. Nevertheless, the state regards the unlawful possession and
sale of drugs as regrettable because of the risks of harm they involve,
i.e., that they will result in harm of the unlawful ingestion of drugs.
The same is true of offenses like Areckless endangerment@10 that are
explicitly defined in terms of risk of harm.
The offenses we have thus far considered all involve
prohibited conduct that is Aobjective@ in the sense that it is conduct
that the state regrets and can identify without making any reference
to an actor=s state of mind. To be sure, a defendant will not be guilty
of an offense requiring mens rea unless in addition to performing the
actus reus, he also does so with the guilty mind required. But with
respect to the aforementioned offenses, the state can determine
whether an actor engages in conduct that the state regards as
regrettable without inquiring into what he was thinking. That is not
9

Cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Model Penal Code ' 211.2.
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true of all criminal offenses, however. Some criminal offenses involve
an actus reus that is itself partly constituted by an actor=s state of
mind. The Model Penal Code offense of attempt is a good example.
As with most offenses, an actor is not guilty of attempt unless he
commits the actus reus of attempt and does so with mens rea. The
mens rea of attempt under the MPC is purpose: an actor is guilty of
attempt to commit crime X under the MPC if, in addition to
performing the actus reus of attempt, he does so with the purpose or
belief that he is committing crime X.11 What is distinctive about
attempt under the MPC, however, is its actus reus because in contrast
to the offenses we have thus far discussed, the actus reus of attempt
under the MPC is itself defined by reference to the mens rea of
attempt. A person performs the actus reus of attempt to commit crime
X under the MPC if he engages in conduct that constitutes a
Asubstantial step@ toward committing crime X; and conduct
constitutes a substantial step toward committing crime X if, and only
if, it is conduct that is Astrongly corroborative of the actor=s criminal
purpose.@12
This is not to say that attempt under the MPC involves no
actus reus. As with all offenses, an actor is guilty of attempt only if he
actualizes his purposes in the world by doing more than possessing
mere thoughts, whether he does so by means of an action or an
omission.13 However, because the actus reus of attempt is defined by
reference to an actor=s mental state, it is not predicated on the
occurrence of regrettable harms or risks in the way that other offenses
are. To be sure, some criminal attempts, like Hinckley=s attempted
assassination of Ronald Reagan, present the most frightful risks. But
other criminal attempts, such as sting operations, do not. The actus
reus of attempt is conduct the state prohibits not because it consists of

See Model Penal Code ' 5.01(1).
Model Penal Code ' 5.01(2).
13
For discussion of the moral and legal prohibition punishing a person for
mere thoughts, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts, 18 LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 379-405 (1999).
11
12
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regrettable harms or risks but because it manifests an undesirable
readiness on an actor=s part to bring such harms or risks about.14
Nevertheless, regardless of the form the actus reus of an offense
takes, an actor is not guilty of the offense unless he engages in it.
Thus, an actor is not guilty of homicide unless he unlawfully causes
the death of another human being; he is not guilty of drug possession
or sale unless he unlawfully possesses or sells drugs; and he is not
guilty of attempting crime X unless he takes a substantial step toward
it that strongly corroborates his purpose to commit crime X. In each
case, in measuring his conduct by what the statute declares to be a
regrettable harm or risk or otherwise undesirable conduct, a person
who does not commit the actus reus of a charged offense can rightly
say, AI did nothing wrong.@
B. The Defense of Justification
Commentators differ sharply over the nature of justification
and its relationship to excuse. Some argue that there is no moral
distinction between justification and excuse.15 Others argue that
there is a significant distinction, while disagreeing among themselves
about the very nature of the distinction -- some arguing that
justification is a state of mind,16 others arguing that it is a state of
affairs,17 and still others arguing that it is both.18 Despite their
This is why there is no such thing as a Ajustified@ attempt. As we shall see,
justification comes into play only after an actor has produced a harm or risk that
the criminal law otherwise regards as regrettable, something that an actor does
not necessarily do in committing an inchoate offense. See Peter Westen and
James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, Not an Excuse
B And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 878-79 (2003)(hereinafter
AThe Criminal Defense of Duress@).
15
See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53
DUKE L.J. 1 (2003).
16
See, e.g., Berman, Justification and Excuse, p. 47; Kent Greenawalt, The
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1847, 1903-11
(1984).
17
See, e.g., Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW
95-124.
18
See, e.g., John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in HARM AND
CULPABILITY 103, 105 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
14
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differences, however, commentators agree that justification (or
justification and excuse, for those who doubt the distinction) is a
defense that comes into play once the actus reus of an offense is
complete. Justification is the claim by an actor that in so far as he
committed the actus reus of an offense, he is not blameworthy because
he committed it in the context of a choice of evils that justified his
committing it.19
I shall be arguing that there is a significant normative
distinction between Ajustification@ and Aexcuse,@ properly understood.
To illuminate the distinction I have in mind, however, it is important
to demystify a distinction that is not normatively significant but
merely formal -- namely, the distinction between the actus reus
defenses previously discussed and choice-of-evils defenses to an actus
reus. Choice-of-evils defenses to an actus reus arise with respect to
offenses like murder and drug sales that are predicated on material
harms or risks a state has a prima facie interest in preventing.20 As
such, choice-of-evils defenses can be framed in one or the other of
two ways without altering their normative effect: they can be
explicitly framed as defenses of Ajustification@ that come into play
once the actus reus is complete; or, alternatively, the negation of such
choices of evils can be included as a portion of the actus reus.
Whichever form they take, an actor who possesses such a defense can
rightly say the same thing of himself as an actor who fails to commit
the actus reus of an offense, namely, AI did nothing wrong.@
To illustrate, consider a paradigmatic choice of evils. Suppose
that a policeman in North Dakota, cooly and deliberately shoots and
kills an armed assailant whom he has warned to drop his gun but who
endangers the lives of the policeman and others by continuing to fire
at them. Suppose, too, that the policeman is charged with murder
under a North Dakota statute that makes it an offense to
Aintentionally or knowingly caus[e] the death of another human
being.@21 The policeman can hardly deny that he committed the actus
reus of Acausing the death of another human being.@ Nor can the
Cf. Model Penal Code '' 3.01, 3.02.
See John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, p. 107.
21
North Dakota Century Code ' 12.1-16-01(1)(a) (2004).
19
20
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policeman deny that he killed Aintentionally.@ The policeman
nevertheless has a defense to murder under North Dakota law
because, having declared it to be prima facie undesirable to Acause
the death of another human being,@ North Dakota goes on to specify
situations in which killings are not regrettable, all things considered B
namely, when they are necessary to protect oneself or others from
being unlawfully killed or seriously wounded.22 North Dakota thus
proceeds in two steps. First, it defines the actus reus of murder broadly
to consist of the harm of Acaus[ing] the death of another human
being,@ despite the fact that the broad definition includes killings that
North Dakota does not regard as regrettable. Then, having defined
the actus reus of murder overbroadly as something that is only prima
facie prohibited, North Dakota specifies subsets of those homicides
that it declares to be Ajustified@ (including the circumstances under
which the policeman acted) B thereby implicitly specifying a residual
subset that it regards as not justified. Needless to say, North Dakota
could have achieved the same substantive results in a single step by
combining the actus reus of Acausing the death of another human
being@ with the residual set of homicides that its justification
provisions now implicitly specify to be not justified. Thus, North
Dakota could have said that an actor is guilty of murder if, while
acting intentionally or with knowledge, he Aunjustifiably causes the
death of another human being@ -- or, more explicitly, Acauses the
death of a human being without its being necessary to protect himself
or others from being unlawfully killed or seriously wounded.@ Indeed,
that is precisely what the statute with which I began the last section
does, i.e., the statute that makes it an offense to Aunlawfully and with
malice aforethought cause the death of another human being.@ The
term Aunlawful@ in the statute is a catch-all within the actus reus of
murder that incorporates by reference all the circumstances in which
actors are not confronted with choices of evils that negate the harm
of killing a human being.23
See North Dakota Century Code ' 12.1-16-01(2)(b) (2004).
This is not to say that the term Aunlawful@ always refers to absence of
justification in criminal statute. It can be used as mere surplusage. See, e.g., the
English statute in R v. R, [1992] 1 AC 599, [1991] 4 All ER 481, and the Ohio
22
23
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The difference, then, between a statute like North Dakota=s,
which proceeds in two steps, and a statute that proceeds in one step is
entirely formal. Every choice of evil that is stated as a Ajustification@
within a two-step statute that possesses an overly broad actus reus
could be stated instead in negative form within a one-step statute
consisting of an actus reus alone.24 Indeed, every criminal statute that
makes it a crime to Aunlawfully@ engage in certain conduct does
precisely that by using the term Aunlawfully@ to incorporate absenceof-justification by reference. It follows, therefore, that an actor who
commits the actus reus within a two-step statute but possesses a
justification under the statute has the same substantive defense as an
actor who fails to commit the actus reus of an offense within a onestep statute. Each can rightly claim that, as measured by the harms or
risks that the statute declares to be regrettable, all things considered,
he did nothing wrong.
In sum, when I speak of Ajustification,@ I use it in the same way
North Dakota does: I use it to refer to a claim by a defendant that in
so far as he effectuated the harm or risk that an actus reus prohibits,
statute in Martin v. Ohio.
24
See Glanville Williams, Offences and Defenses, 2 LEGAL STUDIES 233
(1982). But see George Fletcher, The Nature of Justifications,"in John Gardner,
Jeremy Horder, and Stephen Shute., eds., ACTION AND VALUE IN
CRIMINAL LAW 175-86 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 175-86). John
Gardner concedes Glanville Williams= point as a formal matter. But he argues
that because choice-of-evil defenses are often complex or vague, the decision to
proceed in one step rather than two threatens to jeopardize the Arule of law@ by
transforming offenses that would otherwise be clear and easy for the public to
follow into offenses that are too complex or vague for the public to understand.
See Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, pp. 118, 125-26. However, even if one
believes that choice-of-evils defenses are more complex or vague than actus reus
defenses (and I do not), and even if one believes that the rule of law is less
concerned with choice-of-evil defenses than with actus reus defenses (and, again,
I do not), it does not follow that proceeding in one step leaves the public with
less guidance than two steps. After all, the actus reus elements with which
Gardner is concerned remain precisely the same and precisely as clear when
located in a one-step statute as when located in a two-step statute, and the
choice-of-law defenses remain precisely as complex or vague. If the public can
follow the actus reus when it is located in two-step statute, it can follow the actus
reus when it is located in a one-step statute.
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he was allowed to do so because the harm or risk he effectuated was
no greater than the alternative evil that he would have had to choose
under the dilemmatic circumstances in which he found himself. This
usage of Ajustification@ is normatively significant because it ultimately
rests on the same normative principle that underlies the defense of
lack of actus reus.25 As we have seen, the defense of lack of actus reus
arises with respect to two kinds of offenses: offenses like murder and
drug sales that are predicated on the occurrence of regrettable harms
or risks and, hence, are subject to choice-of-evils defenses; and
offenses like attempt that are not premised upon the occurrence of
regrettable harms or risks (and, hence, are not subject to choice-ofevils defenses) but rather are premised upon an actor=s undesirable
readiness to bring about regrettable harms or risks. In both instances,
the actus reus is conduct the state regards as regrettable or undesirable
under the circumstances. In both instances, therefore, the defense of
lack of actus reus rests on the principle that an actor who is charged
with having engaged in conduct that a criminal statute declares to be
regrettable or undesirable cannot be justly blamed if he did no such
thing -- that is, if he did not engage in that regrettable or undesirable
conduct. The same thing is true of the defenses of justification in
North Dakota. The latter defenses specify the circumstances in
which harms or risks that North Dakota regards as prima facie
regrettable cease to be regrettable, all things considered. Defenses of
justification in North Dakota thus rest on the principle that an actor
who is charged with having produced a harm or risk that the state
regrets, all things considered, cannot be justly blamed if he produced
no such harm or risk, all things considered.
Now if everything is this easy, why the controversy? Why are
commentators so divided about the relationship between justification
and excuse? The reason is that the defenses that most penal codes
provide under the rubric of Ajustification@ are not the choice-of-evils
defenses that we have thus far discussed. That is, they are not
defenses like North Dakota=s that arise when an actor=s commission of
the actus reus of an offense is actually lesser than, or equal to, the
Cf. Heidi Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1561 (1999).
25
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alternative evil he would otherwise have to commit. Rather, they are
defenses that arise when an actor believes that his commission of the
actus reus of an offense is lesser than, or equal to, the alternative evil
he would otherwise have to commit. Take the Model Penal Code.
Like North Dakota, the MPC provides a defense of what it calls
Ajustification@ that comes into play once the actus reus of an offense is
complete. But unlike North Dakota, an actor has such a defense
when he believes that commission of the actus reus is necessary to
prevent certain alternative evils.26 (I shall hereinafter refer to North
Dakota=s usage as the Achoice-of-evils defense,@ and the MPC=s usage
as the Abelief@ defense).
The fact that penal codes use Ajustification@ differently has two
unfortunate consequences B one terminological, the other
substantive. The terminological consequence is that the same word
ends up referring to different substantive defenses, and different words
end up referring to the same substantive defense. To illustrate the
problem of using Ajustification@ to refer to different defenses, suppose
that an actor uses lethal force against an aggressor under
circumstances in which he actually must use lethal force to protect
himself from being wrongfully killed or seriously wounded and in
which he also reasonably believes he must do so. In that event, North
Dakota and the MPC would both acquit the actor, and they would
both do so in the name of Ajustification,@ but they would mean very
different things by it: North Dakota would mean that the actor
actually had to use lethal force to protect himself, even if he didn=t
believe he had to use lethal force; while the MPC would mean that
the actor believed he had to use lethal force, even if actually he didn=t
have to use such force.
Consider now a case in which different terms are used to refer
to the same substantive defense. Thus, suppose that the following
case arises both in North Dakota and under the MPC:

See Model Penal Code ' 3.02(1). But see Paul Robinson, Competing
Theories of Justification: Deeds vs. Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 54 (A.P.
Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996), persuasively criticized in Berman,
Justification and Excuse, at 42-43 & nn. 83-84.
26
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Mistaken Self-Defense
John, who is openly gay within a
homophobic community, has been
physically assaulted many times
because of his sexual orientation,
sometimes very brutally. To protect
himself from such attacks in the
future, John qualifies for and carries a
concealed weapon. Unaware that
John is armed, John=s co-workers play
a prank on him by hiring three young
actors who dress like thugs and, while
wielding tire irons, grab John outside a
gay bar and threaten to lynch him.
Unfortunately, before the actors can
reveal the prank, John pulls out his
gun and, in the reasonable belief that
his life is in danger, shoots and kills
one of them.

North Dakota and the MPC would both acquit John, and they
would do so for the same reason -- namely, that despite the fact that
John regrettably killed a person who was no real threat to him, John
nevertheless acted in good faith and, hence, is not blameworthy. But
North Dakota and the MPC use different terms to refer to the
defense. The MPC would say that because John believed he had to
kill in self-defense even though he didn=t, he was Ajustified.@27 In
contrast, given that John did not have to kill in self-defense, North
Dakota would deny that he was Ajustified@ but rule that because John
reasonably believed he had to kill in self-defense, he was Aexcused.@28
The more significant problem is substantive rather than
merely terminological. By equating Ajustification@ with the Abelief
defense,@ jurisdictions become unable to draw North Dakota=s
distinction between justification and excuse. And being unable to
27
28

Model Penal Code ' 3.04.
North Dakota 12.1-05-08 (2003).
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draw the distinction, they adopt defenses of justification that are
normatively inconsistent with their definitions of actus reus.29 To
illustrate, suppose that the following cases arise in North Dakota and
under the MPC alike:
Murder. Jim, a hitman, deliberately
shoots at Victim with the intention of
killing him, and he succeeds.
Attempted Murder. Jim 2d , also a
hitman, deliberately shoots at a Victim
2d with the intention of killing Victim
2d but, because Victim 2d is wearing a
bulletproof vest, Jim 2d merely wounds
him.
Unwitting Self-Defense. Jim 3d, also a
hitman, deliberately shoots at an old
enemy Victim 3d with the intention of
killing him, and he succeeds B only to
discover afterwards that if he had
waited a moment longer, Victim 3d
would have shot and killed him first
North Dakota and the MPC would reach the same results in
AMurder@ and AAttempted Murder@ and for the same reasons. North
Dakota and the MPC would rule that although Jim and Jim 2d both
possessed the same guilty minds, Jim committed an actus reus
consisting of the material harm of homicide, while Jim 2d committed
an actus reus consisting merely of a readiness to inflict such harm.
And North Dakota and the MPC would both reason that the actus
reus of murder warrants higher penalties than the actus reus of
attempted murder. The substantive difference arises with respect to
Paul Robinson is the most original and powerful exponent of the view that
justification ought to be defined by reference to an actor=s actual conduct (which
Robinson refers to as Adeed@) rather than an actor=s beliefs (which Robinson
refers to as Areasons@). See Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN
CRIMINAL LAW 100-24.
29
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AUnwitting Self-Defense.@ North Dakota would acquit Jim 3d of
murder, reasoning that because Jim 3d=s killing of Victim 3d was
actually necessary to protect himself from being wrongly killed, the
killing was a Ajustified@ choice of evil. At the same time, however,
North Dakota would presumably convict Jim 3d of attempted murder,
reasoning that although Jim 3d failed to bring about the evil of
unjustified homicide, he was guilty of trying to do so.30 In contrast,
the MPC would convict Jim 3d of murder rather than attempted
murder, on the ground that when Jim 3d intentionally killed Victim
3d, he did so without believing that it was necessary to protect himself
and, hence, without what the MPC requires for Ajustification.@
Notice that North Dakota=s decision in Unwitting SelfDefense to acquit Jim 3d of murder but convict him of attempted
murder is consistent with both its reasoning and the MPC=s reasoning
in Murder and Attempted Murder. After all, the reason that North
Dakota and the MPC both acquit his predecessor, Jim 2d, of murder
and convict him of attempted murder is that, although Jim 2d tried
his best to inflict a wrongful death that North Dakota and the MPC
wished to prevent, he failed to do so. The same thing is true of Jim 3d
in Unwitting Self-Defense: Jim 3d tried his best to inflict a wrongful
death but, like Jim 2d, he failed. Instead, he inflicted a harm that was
lesser than or equal to the harm he would have otherwise suffered
and, hence, a harm that neither North Dakota nor the MPC seeks to
prevent under the circumstances. And North Dakota rules
accordingly by treating Jim 3d as an attempted murderer. In
contrast, the MPC=s resolution of Unwitting Self-Defense is
inconsistent with its reasoning in Murder and Attempted Murder,
because in the latter two cases, the MPC takes into account whether
an actor succeeds in inflicting the harm he intends, while in
Unwitting Self-Defense it does not.31
It will be recalled that the defense of Achoice of evils@ does not apply to
crimes like criminal attempt, because the choice-of-evils defense only applies to
offenses like murder and drug sales that are defined by reference to resulting
harms or risks. See note _____, supra.
31
John Gardner makes a point of distinguishing the Aobjective@ nature of
justification from the Aobjective@ question whether punishment should be made
30
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Now one might argue that Unwitting Self-Defense differs
from Attempted Murder precisely in that the former involves the
harm of homicide while the latter does not. Of course, it is true that
like all choices of evils, Unwitting Self-Defense does involve the
inflicting of an evil. The point, however, is that when an actor inflicts
an evil that is lesser than or equal to the evil that would otherwise
befall him, the evil he inflicts is not a wrongful evil. It is not an evil
that the state wishes he had refrained from inflicting under the
circumstances, and, hence, it is not an evil that the state regrets, all
things considered. Indeed, if the MPC regretted the evil that Jim 3d
actually inflicted, i.e., the evil of killing a person who would otherwise
have killed him, the MPC would not offer defenses of Ajustification@ to
actors who know full well what harm they are doing and
intentionally inflict it. Alternatively, it might be argued that the
MPC is right to judge Jim 3d on the basis of what he believed he was
doing because states ought to judge actors on what they undertake
rather than on what fortuitously ensues. This is not the place to
debate the much mooted question whether criminal punishment
ought to be based solely upon the intentions with which a person acts
and not at all upon resulting harms. For even if one takes that
position (and I, for one, do not),32 that is not what the MPC achieves.
The MPC and North Dakota both believe that results signify, which
is why they both distinguish between murder and attempted murder,
and why their differing positions on justification ought to matter to
them. The difference between them is that while North Dakota holds
Jim 3d responsible solely for attempted murder precisely because he
did not bring about the kind of wrongful harm for which it reserves
the offense of murder, the MPC=s definition of Ajustification@ misleads
to depend upon the bad luck of resulting harm. Gardner, Justifications and
Reasons, pp. 104-05. In doing so, however, he obscures the fact that the only
reason it matters to defendants whether justification is defined objectively as
North Dakota defines it or also subjectively as Gardner and the MPC define it is
that defining it in the former fashion enables a jurisdiction to take account of
what is distinction in cases like the Unwitting Self-Defender, namely, that the
defendant had the Aluck@ not to have caused objective harm.
32
See Peter Westen, Some Commonplace Confusions Regarding Consent in Rape
Cases, 2 OHIO STATE CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW (Fall, 2004, forthcoming).

18

Westen

it into punishing Jim 3d for a crime of wrongful harm, even though for
he did not inflict a harm that the MPC regrets under the
circumstances.
C. Excuse
AExcuse,@ as I define it, encompasses all exculpatory defenses
that do not consist of either absence of actus reus or justification.
That is, it encompasses all instances in which an actor can rightly
claim, AEven if I committed the actus reus of the offense with which I
am charged, and whether or not I committed it without justification,
I did not do so while in possession of features that the law requires for
a person to be held blameworthy for doing so.@33
This usage is broader than one finds elsewhere. Some
commentators confine Aexcuse@ to defenses such as insanity,
involuntariness, and immaturity that come into play after a person
concedes, at least arguendo, that he not only committed the actus reus
of an offense while possessed of the mens rea the charged offense
requires, whether the latter consists of purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, negligence or some other mental condition.34 My usage
of Aexcuse@ is broader in two respects. First, with respect to persons
who concede, at least arguendo, that they committed the actus reus of
an offense, I use Aexcuse@ to encompass not only absences of
Douglas Husak challenges the conventional view that the defense of
justification is logically and normatively prior to the defense of excuse. See
Douglas Husak, On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse (manuscript).
Husak argues, instead, that, although excuse is a defense that comes into play
only after an actor commits an offense (including elements of actus reus and mens
rea), it is not a defense that comes into play only after an actor commits an
unjustified offense. I find Husak=s argument entirely persuasive, with one minor
exception. Because I shall be asserting that excuse encompasses the defense of
lack of mens rea, I say, contrary to Husak, that although excuse is, indeed, a
defense that comes into play only after an actor commits the actus reus of an
offense, it is not a defense that comes into play only after an actor does so with
mens rea.
34
See Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL LAW at
81-83.
33
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responsibility such as insanity, immaturity, and involuntary
intoxication, but also absences of the mens rea that charged offenses
require, including defenses of mistake of law and mistake of fact.35
Second, I use Aexcuse,@ as North Dakota does, to refer to actors like
John in AMistaken Self-Defense@ who mistakenly believe that their
conduct is actually necessary to prevent a greater evil under the
circumstances. Like North Dakota (but unlike the Model Penal
Code), I would say of John, AHe has no claim of justification, because
he brought about a state of affairs that the state regards as regrettable
under the circumstances. But he is excused because although he did
a bad thing, he did not do it with a guilty mind.@
Of course, commentators are free to define Aexcuse@ in any
way they wish. Ultimately, however, the measure of a definition is its
perspicuousness. The perspicuousness of a definition of excuse is a
function of the degree to which it revealingly includes defenses that
are normatively alike while excluding defenses that are normatively
unalike. I will try to show in part IV that, by that measure, an
attitudinal theory of excuses is superior to the competing theories
discussed in part III.
II. A CHALLENGE TO ALL NORMATIVE THEORIES OF AEXCUSE@
All normative theories of excuse, including those I discuss in
part III and my own in part IV, rest on a shared assumption that
Aexcuse@ is a normative set that can be coherently and meaningfully
distinguished from Ajustification.@ Most commentators who write
about justification and excuse make that assumption, though they
differ, and sometimes heatedly, as to what the distinction is. A few
commentators, however, engage in a more radical critique. They
challenge the very possibility of fashioning a normative theory of
Aexcuse@ in contradistinction to Ajustification@ because they deny that

Accordingly, because Aexcuse@ concedes, at least arguendo, that an actor is
guilty of the actus reus of an offense, it does not refer to defenses of mens rea
with respect to offenses like attempt in which mens rea is constitutive of actus
reus.
35
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any such distinction exists.36 I shall discuss two such critiques B those
of Kent Greenawalt, and Mitchell Berman.
A. Kent Greenawalt
Kent Greenawalt wrote a celebrated article in 1985 criticizing
efforts to distinguish justification and excuse in law, and he later
revisited and expanded upon his criticisms on two occasions.37 Some
of Greenawalt=s criticisms are irrelevant to our inquiry because they
are confined to proposed distinctions between justification and excuse
that I reject for the same reasons he does. Thus, Greenawalt
criticizes the coherence and practicality of distinctions between
Ajustification@ and Aexcuse@ that are based upon the following:
whether conduct is Apositively desirable@ as opposed to Awrongful;@38
whether an actor reasonably believes he is choosing a lesser evil (even
if mistakenly) as opposed to unreasonably believing it;39 whether a
defense is general and objective as opposed to individual and subjective;40
and whether third persons are permitted to assist the actor (as
opposed to being prohibited from assisting him) and whether they and
the victim are prohibited from resisting him (as opposed to being
permitted to resist him).41 The distinction I propose does not possess
any of these features and, hence, is not subject to criticisms that are
confined to them. Rather, I argue that conduct is Ajustified@ not only
when it is positively desirable but also when it is not undesirable and,
hence, merely permitted;42 that conduct is justified not by virtue of an
See, e.g., Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, pp. 492-93.
See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1847 (1984)(hereinafter APerplexing Borders@); Kent
Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 89 (1986); Kent Greenawalt, Justifications, Excuses,
and a Model Penal Code for Democratic Societies, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 14
(Winter/Spring 1998).
38
See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, at p. 1899, 1906.
39
See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1907-11.
40
See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1915-18.
41
See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1918-27.
42
See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 866-72,
883-88. Cf. Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in
Criminal Law, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 61, 81-87 (1984).
36
37
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actor=s believing the alternative to be a greater evil but by virtue of the
alternative actually being a greater evil; that the measure of relative
evils (and, hence, the existence of justification) can be a function of
subjective factors in the form of role-based or agent-relative
considerations that shape an actor=s legitimate interests in acting one
way as opposed to another;43 and that the presence of justification
does not determine whether third parties may assist an actor, nor does
the presence of excuse determine whether third parties and an actor=s
victim may resist him.44
Some of Greenawalt=s other criticisms are also irrelevant
because they are confined to certain aims for distinguishing between
justification and excuse that I do not share. Thus, Greenawalt argues
that because of the rightful role of general verdicts in jury trials, jury
instructions based upon distinctions between justification and excuse
will do nothing to clarify jury verdicts.45 He also argues that jury
instructions that are based upon the terms Ajustification@ and
Aexcuse,@ and instructions that require jurors to agree on individual
defenses of justification and excuse, will only complicate jury
deliberations.46 I agree. My aim in distinguishing between
justification and excuse is not to bring greater clarity to general
criminal verdicts. Nor is it to instruct juries in the language of
Ajustification@ and Aexcuse.@ Nor is it to require that jurors agree that
individual defenses of justification and excuse exist where they can
agree that either one or the other of such defenses exist. To be sure,
jurors need to understand the elements of the criminal defenses they
apply, whether the defenses consist of insanity, mistake of law,
necessity or duress. But they need not be told that the reason the law
recognizes insanity is that it is an excuse, and that by virtue of being
an excuse, it shares something in common with mistake of law. Nor
need they be told that they must agree on whether a certain defense
See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 864-72.
See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 869-72,
917-21
45
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, at 1900-01.
46
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1902, 1910-11; Greenawalt, Justifications,
Excuses, and a Model Penal Code for Democratic Societies, pp. 17-18.
43
44
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(of justification) exists before they may agree on whether a certain
defense (of excuse)exists, provided that it suffices that they agree that
either one or the other exists.
Nevertheless, some of the criticisms that Greenawalt directs to
other distinctions between justification and excuse do apply to my
own. And among the aims he dismisses for distinguishing between
them is one that I embrace. Specifically, he believes it is generally
Acounter-productive@ for lawmakers -- that is, legislators who must
enact defenses and judges who must construe and fashion them -- to
try to ground their lawmaking in the distinction between justification
and excuse.47 In contrast, I believe that lawmakers who are engaged in
fashioning new exculpatory defenses or clarifying existing exculpatory
defenses can only benefit by asking themselves, AWhat is the basis for
this defense? Is it that actors who invoke the defense have produced
no harm or risk that the state regards as regrettable for persons in their
circumstances to have produced -- nothing, that is, the state wishes
such persons had done otherwise under the circumstances? Or is it
that, regardless of whether actors who invoke the defense have
engaged in conduct the state regards as regrettable or undesirable for
persons in their circumstances to have performed, they lacked certain
additional features that must obtain for persons to be blameworthy for
such conduct?@48
Greenawalt has three objections to the kind of distinction I
propose. His first objection is linguistic. It departs from ordinary
language to use Ajustification@ in law for conduct that is merely
permissible, he says, because Ajustification@ is usually used in moral
discourse to refer to conduct that is positively desirable. I=m not sure
Greenawalt is right about ordinary language. Like most people,
speakers probably assume that Adesirable conduct@ and Aundesirable
conduct@ together occupy the field without leaving any middle ground
between them. Once speakers realize that conduct may be neither
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, at 1915. Nevertheless, Greenawalt does
encourage scholars to continue to reflect on the distinction. See id. at 1901-03,
1913.
48
For another critique of Greenawalt, see Hurd, Justification and Excuse,
Wrongdoing and Culpability.
47
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desirable nor undesirable but merely permissible, they might, indeed,
describe permissible conduct as morally Ajustified@ conduct. Even if
they did not, however, nothing precludes the law from using
Ajustification@ as a term of art to encompass both undesirable and
permissible conduct. Law students learn early on that words can be
used differently in law than in ordinary language .49
Greenawalt=s other linguistic objection involves cases that
North Dakota and I regard as excuses rather than justifications,
namely, cases in which an actor reasonably believes that the harm or
risk he imposes is necessary to avoid a greater evil, only to discover
afterwards that he was mistaken and that the harm or risk served no
purpose at all. Greenawalt concedes that when speakers elaborate
upon such cases, they qualify their statements by distinguishing
between the act and the actor by saying, >The act was not justified,
but the actor was=.50 But, Greenawalt says, given that states do not
qualify their statements in that way -- that is, given that states use the
single label of either Ajustification@ or Aexcuse@ to refer tout coup to
defenses that such actors possess -- states should use Ajustification@
rather than Aexcuse.@ They should do so, he says, because
Ajustification@ is a term of Amoral appraisal,@51 and Aif one is concerned
with judging the actor, the actor=s blameless perception of the facts
ought to be sufficient to support a justification.@52
Now we have previously seen that within states that use
Ajustification@ to include what is merely permissible (as opposed to
desirable), Ajustification@ is not necessarily a term of moral approval.
But even if Ajustification@ were a term of moral approval, and even
though the law is concerned with Ajudging@ an actor, it is a non
sequitur for Greenawalt to conclude that in order to Ajudg[e]@ him, the
See Heidi Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1557 (1999)(AWe should thus avoid ham stringing
our analysis of the distinction between justified and excused actions by an ex
ante requirement that we use moral language the way that it is used in daily
gossip . . . .@).
50
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1908.
51
Greenawalt, Perplexing Problems, p. 1916 n.55.
52
Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses,@ at p. 102. See also
Greenawalt, Perplexing Problems, p. 1906.
49
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law ought to use Ajustification@ to refer to what an actor reasonably
believes he is doing as opposed to what he actually does. After all, with
respect to any offense that consists of (1) an actus reus of actual harm
or risk and (2) mens rea regarding such harm or risk, there are two
independent grounds on which an actor might be adjudged innocent of
the offense: first, on the ground that regardless of any guilty mind he
may have had, he did not actually bring about the harm or risk that
the statute declares to be regrettable; and second, on the ground that
regardless of the regrettable harm or risk he may have actually
brought about, he reasonably believed otherwise and, hence, lacked a
guilty mind. States like North Dakota follow the same approach with
respect to exculpatory defenses that arise after an actor has
committed the actus reus of an offense with proscribed mens rea.
North Dakota invokes these two grounds that govern whether actors
are guilty of offenses and also applies them to determine whether
actors are guilty of exculpatory defenses. Thus, with respect to an
actor who has committed the actus reus of an offense with proscribed
mens rea, North Dakota is willing to exculpate him on either of two
alternative grounds, namely: (1) on the ground that, given the choice
of evils at issue, the actor did not actually bring about a harm or risk
that the law regrets under the circumstances; or (2) on the ground
that, although the actor may actually have brought about a harm or
risk that the law regrets under the circumstances, he reasonably
believed otherwise and, hence, lacked a guilty mind with respect to
the choice of evils he believed he faced. Greenawalt argues that in so
far as states enact a defense such as #1, they should not call the
defense Ajustification.@ But the reason Greenawalt gives (i.e., that
Ajustification@ is a term of Amoral appraisal@ for Ajudging [an] actor@
and therefore should only be used to refer to defenses such as #2) is a
non sequitur because defenses #1 and #2 are both part of Ajudging@ an
actor. Defense #1, which North Dakota happens to call
Ajustification,@ judges an actor by what he does; defense #2, which
North Dakota happens to call Aexcuse,@ judges him further by what he
reasonably believes he is doing. Admittedly, if Greenawalt had his way,
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he would abolish defense #1 altogether.53 But within jurisdictions
that recognize defenses #1 and #2, calling them Ajustification@ and
Aexcuse,@ respectively, is entirely consistent, linguistically, with law=s
task of Amak[ing] a judgment about [an] actor.@
Greenawalt also raises a theoretical objection to the
distinction I would draw. As the title to his first article suggests,
Greenawalt devotes much of his attention to demonstrating that
theoretical distinctions between justification and excuse collapse at
the Aborderlines@ that should separate them. Most of his illustrations
are irrelevant for our purposes, however, because they concern
distinctions between justification and excuse that I reject, sometimes
for the same reasons he does. Nevertheless, Greenawalt offers one
illustration that is pertinent, namely, the defense of duress. An actor
has a defense under the Model Penal Code to what would otherwise
be an offense if he was Acoerced@ to commit it by a threat of unlawful
force against himself or another that Aa person of reasonable firmness
in his situation would have been unable to resist.@54 Greenawalt
argues that duress under the MPC is a unitary defense which is stated
broadly enough to encompass two quite distinct situations, one of
which is pure justification, and the other of which is pure excuse.
Duress is pure justification, he says, when what an actor does is a
choice-of-evil that in other settings would constitute necessity.
Duress is an excuse, he says, when what an actor does is not a choice
of evils that in other settings would constitute necessity and, yet,
remains exculpatory under the circumstances. The two examples of
duress as excuse he gives are: (1)A[w]hen threats lead people to make
understandable choices favoring family interest over the equal or
more powerful interests of strangers;@ and (2) when a coercive threat
Greenawalt claims that predicating justification on acts as they actually are
(rather than on what actors reasonably believe them to be) requires that one
possess a Acomplex theory of moral judgment.@ Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p.
1909 n.34. But that is not so. It requires only that, in deciding whether to
punish an actor, the state possess a legitimate interest in ascertaining, ADid he
actually do anything that we firmly wish he had not done under the
circumstances?
54
Model Penal Code ' 2.09.
53
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renders an actor Aincapable of making rational judgments.@55
Greenawalt concludes that because the defense of duress under the
MPC encompasses both justification and excuse, Asimplicity@ argues in
favor of retaining a unitary defense rather than teasing out its separate
strands.56
Greenawalt=s objection is puzzling on several grounds. First,
on the assumption that examples 1 and 2 are indeed instances of
excuse, Greenawalt=s use of duress runs counter to the thrust of his
article. Far from showing that the borderland between justification
and excuse is Ablurred,@57 he argues that duress arises in two contexts - one of which is justification, pure and simple, and the other of which
is excuse, pure and simple. Second, Greenawalt does not seem to
believe what he says about the Asimplicity@ of retaining a defense of
duress that encompasses both justification and excuse because he
concedes that the Abest@ solution in terms of clarity is to define
Anecessity@ to encompass all justified choices and to Aprune@ the
defense of duress to encompass what he believes are solely excuses,
i.e., examples 1 & 2.58
The more serious problem is Greenawalt=s assumption that
examples 1 & 2 are instances of excuse B or, indeed, that any instance
of criminal duress is a non-redundant instance of excuse. I have
argued elsewhere that all instances of duress, except for those rare
cases in which duress is redundant with the defense of
involuntariness, are justifications and, hence, present no Aborderline@
problems at all.59 Take example 1, i.e., where Athreats lead people to
make understandable choices favoring family interest over the equal
or more powerful interests of strangers.@ The existence of Afamily
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1912 & n.41.
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1912.
57
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1902.
58
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1912. Indeed, the most Greenawalt can
muster in defense of the MPC rule is that Ahaving a single unified defense of
duress that reaches justifications and excuses hardly constitutes a breach of any
fundamental principle of what a criminal code should look like.@ Id. at 1913.
See also Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, p. 104.
59
See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, 833-950 and
esp. p. 903 n.129.
55
56
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interest[s]@ are agent-relative interests that the state can take into
consideration in deciding whether conduct that would otherwise be a
greater evil under the circumstances is not and, hence, is justified.60
Example 2 is more difficult, because Greenawalt does not clarify what
he means by a coercive threat that renders an actor Aincapable of
making rational judgments.@ Greenawalt may be referring to rare
cases in which an actor is so disconcerted by a coercive threat that,
like a person swarmed by bees, he acts reflexively rather than assessing
other people=s interests in relation to his own. Such cases are rare
because as an act of coercion, duress is typically employed by
wrongdoers who, rather than wagering on an unthinking reflex on
their victims= part, seek to structure their victims= choices in such a
way that they decide to save themselves at the expense of others. In
any event, the defense of duress is superfluous in cases of unthinking
reflex because the latter are fully addressed by the defense of
Ainvoluntariness,@ just as they are when an actor is swarmed by bees.
It is more likely, therefore, that Greenawalt is referring to cases in
which an actor chooses an evil that would be unjustified if the
alternative evil were natural in origin rather than the purposeful
imposition of a coercive malefactor. However, the reason the defense
of duress is broader than the defense of necessity is not that the
defense duress excuses actors from blame for doing what the state
firmly believes is a greater evil under the circumstances, but that the
very features that distinguish duress from necessity (i.e., that the
threats of duress are human in origin, wrongful, and coercive)
contribute to their evil in the eyes of the state and, hence, render
conduct on an actor=s part that would otherwise be a greater evil not a
greater evil under the circumstances.61 The MPC=s standard of
Indeed, Greenawalt seems to concede as much. See Greenawalt,
Perplexing Borders, p. 1915-16 (AIf "the situation" is defined broadly enough, it may
include roles and relational characteristics; so perhaps their relevance to
justification is not at odds with the idea that justifications are general and
objective@).
60

61

See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 931-44.
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Areasonable firmness@ captures those features. AReasonable firmness@
is not average firmness or typical firmness. It is normatively appropriate
and proportional firmness in the context of a human, wrongful, and
purposefully coercive threats.62 An actor has a defense of duress if,
and only if, his conduct is justified under the circumstances -- that is,
only if his choice is one that the state regards as a normatively
permissible choice for an actor to make, given the human, wrongful,
and purposeful coercion to which he was subjected.
Greenawalt makes one further theoretical objection. He uses
a simple case of assault to ask, >If distinguishing between justification
and excuse is supposedly so useful in analyzing defenses, why is it that
we have no need for the distinction in analyzing offenses?= Thus, he
says, suppose that without realizing Ben is nearby, Ann swings her
arm and hits Ben, within a jurisdiction that makes it an offense for an
actor to intentionally strike a person without the latter=s consent.
The law does not need complicated distinctions such as justification
and excuse to dispose of Ann=s claim, Greenawalt says. It simply
determines that she did not have the mental state required by the
statute, i.e., intention, and, hence, is not guilty.
As long as Ann was unaware that she
might hit Ben, she has not committed
an assault, and the criminal law does
not engage in labeling to decide
whether her arm swinging was justified
or only excused.
If the law=s failure to label acts that do
not amount to crimes is acceptable,
then the question arises whether a
failure to label precisely is
unacceptable
when
other
circumstances preclude liability. If the
law need not determine whether Ann
is justified or excused when she
62
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accidentally hits Ben, why need it
determine precisely whether she is
justified or excused when she strikes in
mistaken self-defense?63
Ironically, the legal situation is precisely the opposite. Rather
than treating offenses differently from the way states like North
Dakota treat defenses, the law treats them the same B causing Ann to
be treated in a way that illustrates the very point Greenawalt seeks to
refute. The law asks two things of Ann: (1) ADid Ann commit the
actus reus of assault inflicting the undesirable harm of striking Ben
without his consent?@ (2) AIf so, did Ann lack the kind of mens rea
that renders a person blameworthy under the statute for doing the
undesirable thing she did?@ The first question parallels North
Dakota=s inquiry into justification by exonerating actors on the
ground that they did nothing the law at hand regards as a harm to be
eschewed under the circumstances. The second question parallels
North Dakota=s inquiry into excuse by exonerating actors on the
ground that, while they did undesirable things, they lacked a feature
that the law requires to render them blameworthy. Ann is exculpated
in law not without reference to notions of justification and excuse, but
precisely by virtue of being Aexcused@64 for having done an undesirable
thing.
Greenawalt=s final objection is political in nature. He argues
that it is politically undesirable to expect lawmakers to reduce the
Acomplexity and diversity of a society=s moral views@65 regarding
defenses to a single, binary distinction between justification and
excuse. To illustrate, he hypothesizes a drafting committee of three
Greenawalt, Distinguishing Between Justifications and Excuses, p. 108. See
also Greenawalt, Justifications, Excuses, and a Model Penal Code for Democratic
Societies, p. 21.
64
Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications From Excuses, p. 198 (AIf Ann=s
swinging arm injures Ben, she might offer an excuse, saying: AI=m sorry, but I
didn=t realize you were there@)(emphasis added).
65
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1903. See also Greenawalt, Distinguishing
Justifications from Excuses, p. 107.
63
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legislators who together must decide whether homeowners ought to
have a duty of retreat, that is, whether homeowners may use deadly
force in defense of their homes even where they could safely retreat
instead. Legislator 1 regards it as positively desirable for homeowners
to stand their ground rather than retreat; Legislator 2 balks at saying
that it is positively desirable for homeowners to stand their ground
when they can safely retreat, but nevertheless believes it is morally
permissible for homeowners to do so; Legislator 3 believes that it is
wrong for homeowners to stand their ground when they can safely
retreat, but he is (i) A[unwilling] to impose his moral conviction
[upon his constituents] and demand behavior that many people find
unnatural,@ and (ii) Askeptical of the capacity of jurors to determine
when someone knows he can retreat safely.@66 The three legislators
differ sharply in their moral assessments of retreat, and, yet, they agree
that homeowners should be able to stand their ground without fear of
criminal liability. However, Greenawalt says, if they must first decide
whether to classify their reasons as Ajustification@ or Aexcuse,@ the
task will not only Atake a lot of time and energy,@ it will fail to capture
their Adivergen[t] moral evaluations@ of retreat.67
Greenawalt=s argument may have force with respect to other
distinctions between justification and excuse. However, with respect
to the distinction I propose, his illustration suggests that rather than
being a political vice, distinguishing between justification and excuse
can be a political virtue. Despite their differences, the three
legislators all have reasons of Ajustification@ for rejecting a duty of
retreat (though, as we shall see, Legislator 3 may also have reasons of
Aexcuse,@ though if he does, his reasons are highly problematic in
criminal law). The three legislators all have reasons of justification
because, measured by the basic question, AHas the actor inflicted a
harm or risk that the state regards as regrettable under the
circumstances?@, they all agree that a homeowner who uses lethal
force rather than retreat does nothing regrettable. Thus, because
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1906. See also Greenawalt, Distinguishing
Justification from Excuse, p. 107; Greenawalt, Justifications, Excuses, and a Model
Penal Code for Democratic Societies, pp. 18-19.
67
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1903, 1906, 1914.
66
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Legislator 1 believes that standing one=s ground is positively desirable,
he would deny that it is regrettable; because Legislator 2 believes that
standing one=s ground is morally permissible, he would also deny that
it is regrettable; and although Legislator 3 believes that it would be
regrettable for homeowners to stand their ground if the law could
accurately determine after-the-fact that they could have retreated
with complete safety, Legislator 3does not believe the law can
accurately make such determinations after-the fact and, therefore,
believes that to avoid convicting homeowners whose actions were not
regrettable, the law must adopt a prophylactic rule that treats all
homeowners as if standing their ground were not regrettable.
Now what about Legislator 3's other reason for rejecting a duty
to retreat, viz., that despite personally believing it to be morally wrong
for homeowners to stand their ground when they can safely retreat, he
is A[unwilling] to impose his moral conviction [upon his constituents]
and demand behavior that many people find unnatural.@ It is not
clear what Greenawalt means in contrasting Legislator 3's personal
moral convictions with those of his constituents. Nor is it clear what
Greenawalt means in saying that the legislator=s constituents find a
duty of retreat Aunnatural.@ If Greenawalt means that while
Legislator 3 personally regards it as wrong for homeowners to stand
their ground rather than retreat, he feels duty-bound to represent his
constituents who in general do not think it is wrong, then, again,
Legislator 3's reasons are reasons of justification; because in rejecting
a duty to retreat, Legislator 3 is speaking for constituents who do not
regard standing one=s ground as regrettable. However, Greenawalt
may mean something else. He may mean that while Legislator 3
believes his constituents agree with him that standing one=s ground is
wrong, Legislator 3 also believes that most of his constituents, being
morally weak, would probably end up doing the wrong thing if they
themselves were in that situation. If that is Legislator 3's stance, the
defense he would be enacting would, indeed, be an excuse rather than
a justification. Nevertheless, Greenawalt is wrong to argue that
Legislator 3 should not have to confront his reason as a putative
excuse. On the contrary, it is politically desirable that Legislator 3
confront what codifying such a excuse would mean, because it would
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force Legislator 3 to recognize that he would be creating an excuse
without precedent in criminal law -- namely, an excuse consisting of
the claim, AMost people would do the same thing under the
circumstances.@ Now it might be thought that the MPC defense of
duress does precisely that in its reference to people of Areasonable
firmness.@ But that is not so. The MPC defense of duress is not
predicated on polls as what most people actually do. If it were, the
defense ought to be generalized to exonerate automobile drivers who,
being late, exceed speed limits; employees who under financial
pressure steal office supplies from their employers; taxpayers who
under financial pressure fudge on their taxes; people who loot in the
context of urban riots; concentration camp guards who commit
crimes against humanity; and ethnic groups that run amok in the
context of ethnic cleansing. The defense of duress is predicated on
what a Areasonable@ person would do, a Areasonable@ person being not
an average person but a right-minded person who, when confronted
with a coercive threat of personal injury to himself or loved ones,
maintains a normatively acceptable balance between his self interests
and the interests of others.
B. Mitchell Berman.
On its face, Mitchell Berman=s critique of prevailing
distinctions between justification and excuse appears to be more
radical than Greenawalt=s. Greenawalt, after all, concedes that there
are paradigmatic cases in law and morals in which the normative
distinction between justification and excuse is both clear and
significant; and Greenawalt thus confines his objections to
Aborderline@ cases in which he believes that the normative distinction
breaks down, though Greenawalt fails to explain how the normative
distinction can be significant in some cases without resting on norms
that are significant generally. In contrast, Berman seems to deny that
there is any normative content to the distinction at all between
justification and excuse because he denies that the distinction can be
a Amoral@ one.68 This is not to say that Berman rejects all distinctions
Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 8-10
(2003).
68
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between justification and excuse. Berman argues that there is a
certain conceptual distinction between justification and excuse that
represents, in turn, a kind of Anormative@ distinction.69 But he argues
that the substantive norms that the conceptual distinction represents
are Asociological@70 norms rather than Amoral@ norms. He thus seems
to deny what every other commentator who writes about justification
and excuse assumes -- namely, that justification stands for conduct
that is right and good (or at least not wrong and bad ), and that
excuse stands for conduct that is wrongful but blameless.
In reality, however, Berman=s critique is not what it seems.
Berman does not deny that the distinction between justification and
excuse in law is a normative distinction between conduct that is not
wrongful, on the one hand, and conduct that is wrongful but
blameless, on the other. Indeed, the Asociological@ inquiry that his
own definition of Ajustification@ requires is an inquiry into what
jurisdictions wish their citizens to aspire to do.71 Rather, when
Berman denies that justification and excuse can represent Amoral@
judgments in law, he is using Amoral@ and Asociological@ in nonstandard ways to make a different point that can scarcely be disputed.
I shall first address the portion of Berman=s article that appears to
speak to normative distinctions between justification and excuse such
as mine. I will then say something about the merits of his own
Aconceptual@ distinction between justification and excuse.
Berman sets up what he calls the Astandard account@ of
justification and excuse in law, namely, that legally justified conduct
is conduct that is not Amorally wrongful,@ while legally excused
conduct is conduct that is Amorally wrongful@ but nevertheless
morally Ablameless.@72 He then proceeds to argue that the standard
account is and will continue to be fundamentally inconsistent with
the shape of criminal law defenses. In doing so, however, Berman
reveals that far from criticizing a Aconsensus@ view, he is criticizing a
strawman that, as far as I can tell, no one would embrace. Berman
Berman, Justification and Excuse, pp. 5, 10, 24-25, 30-31, 48.
Berman, Justification and Excuse, pp. 30-31, 37.
71
Berman, Justification and Excuse, pp. 32-33.
72
Berman, Justification and Excuse, pp. 7-9.
69
70

34

Westen

reveals that he is not denying that justified conduct is conduct that is
not normatively wrongful. Nor is Berman denying that excused
conduct is conduct that is normatively wrongful but not normatively
blameworthy. Rather, he is making the non-controversial assertion
that the kinds of normative judgments of right and wrong, blameless
and blameworthy, that enter into judgments of justification and
excuse in law are not necessarily the same as they would be in ethics.
That is to say, in denying that there is a Amoral@ basis to the
distinction between justification and excuse in law, Berman is stating
what most law students discover early in on, namely, that the legal
rules that govern the state=s official condemnation of its citizens are
not, and ought not to be, identical to the ethical norms that govern
people=s personal reproaches of one another.
Legal norms of state-imposed punishment differ from personal
norms of interpersonal reproach because, even if they have common
origins, the institutions and sanctions of state-imposed punishment
differ significantly from those of interpersonal reproach. Interpersonal
reproof is just that: it is personal and typically private or semi-private;
while official condemnation is purposefully impersonal and
purposefully public. Individuals who reproach one another typically
know one another and, if they make mistakes, can correct them;
while the institutions of official punishment are state officials and
random jurors with no personal knowledge of the events and little
ability to correct mistakes. The sanctions of personal reproach are
gradational and relatively mild, ranging from a raised eye-brow to
verbal chastisement to social ostracism; while the sanctions of official
punishment are crude and severe, ranging from public condemnation
to incarceration to death. Accordingly, even if lawmakers and the
public started with identical senses of wrongdoing and blame, one
would expect the official rules of criminal law to differ from the
ethical rules of interpersonal relationships. Nevertheless, the fact that
lawmakers end up making different judgments of wrongdoing and
blame in the criminal context than they and the public make in
interpersonal contexts does not prevent their judgments in law from
being judgments of wrongdoing and blame.
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Consider a case in which a 6-year, 11-month-old boy
purposefully breaks all of his sister=s porcelain dolls or tortures a family
pet. The boy=s parents will rightly behave differently than the juvenile
courts. The parents, who are intimate with the boy=s motivation, may
well scold him, demand that he apologize, and impose other domestic
sanctions, while continuing to monitor his responses and
development. The juvenile court, in contrast, will surely dismiss all
charges on the ground that, being under the age of seven, he is too
young to be punished at the hands of the state. So why it is that the
boy has an excuse of Aimmaturity@ in law that he does not have at
home? Is it because the law believes that children have no sense of
responsibility at 6 years 11 months and, yet, suddenly acquire it at the
moment they turn 7? Is it because lawmakers at work abjure the
moral bearings they possess at home? Is it because the law=s excuse of
immaturity is entirely lacking in normative basis? Clearly not.
Legislators recognize that because the juvenile court system is
impersonal, because its public declarations of delinquency are highly
stigmatic, because the few sanctions at its disposal are harsh, and
because it is in institutionally incapable of tailoring juvenile sanctions
to the gradational senses of responsibility of children under 7, the
juvenile delinquency systems ought to follow a bright-line rule that
leaves the disciplining of children under 7 to their parents. The law=s
excuse of immaturity is not lacking in normativity; it is consciously
based upon normative judgments regarding the difference between
public reproof and inter-personal reproof.73
Berman advocates a Aconceptual@ distinction between
justification and excuse that, he says, reflects Asociological@ facts but
in reality is grounded in normative judgments. A defense is a
Ajustification,@ he says, if it renders permissible conduct that would
otherwise be a crime. A defense is an Aexcuse,@ in turn, if it renders
non-punishable conduct that is criminal.74 This distinction is
substantive, Berman says, not formal. That is, the distinction does
For a description of the various ages at which various jurisdictions regard
children as possessing criminal responsibility, see Lisa Micucci, Responsibility and
the Young Person, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 277, 279-86 (1998).
74
Berman, Justifications and Excuses, pp. 24-25.
73
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not depend upon whether the legislature uses the terms Apermissible@
or Anon-punishable.@75 Rather, the distinction turns upon the
normative judgments that legislatures and courts make in enacting
and interpreting defenses. A defense renders conduct permissible if,
and only if, its true legislative purpose is to declare, >This is the norm
by which we, the legislature, call on people to guide their conduct, the
norm that we aspire that people follow=.76 A defense is an excuse if
for any reason the legislature does not wish to punish actors whose
conduct falls short of what the legislature has called upon them to do.
The measure of any internally-consistent distinction between
justification and excuse is its usefulness, particularly in relation to
competing distinctions. I have two doubts about the usefulness of
Berman=s distinction. The first concerns Berman=s definition of
Ajustifications.@ I doubt that it is possible to determine with any
confidence whether a legislature=s true motive in enacting an
exculpatory defense is to declare how the legislature aspires that
people behave (as opposed to what the legislature regards as
acceptable conduct under the circumstances), or whether the
legislature=s true motive is to exonerate actors whose conduct falls
short of what the legislature aspires that people do. I could use any
exculpatory defense to illustrate this problem. But consider a
legislature that, having made it a crime ATo intentionally kill another
human being,@ provides a defense to those who AReasonably believe
that using lethal force is necessary to protect themselves from being
unlawfully killed, even if they are mistaken in their belief.@ According
to Berman, if the legislature=s true motive is to inspire people to follow
the injunction, AThou shalt not kill,@ while simultaneously providing a
defense for those who kill in self-defense, then the defense is an
Aexcuse.@ If, on the other hand, the legislature=s true motive is to
inspire people to ascertain facts as best they can and reluctantly to kill
rather than be wrongly killed, then the defense is a Ajustification.@
The problem is that if individual legislators were casually polled, they
would probably confess to having both motives; and, yet, because the
process of legislating does not call upon them to rank their motives in
75
76

Berman, Justifications and Excuses, p. 37-38.
Berman, Justifications and Excuses, pp. 31-33, 50, 53-56, 73-74.
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those terms, there is no way to determine after the fact which motives
predominated.
The second problem with Berman=s distinction concerns his
definition of Aexcuses.@ Berman defines Aexcuses@ in such as way as to
preclude them from possessing anything normatively in common
other than that they lead to acquittals. He defines them as consisting
of all defenses that are not Ajustifications@ -- including both
exculpatory defenses like insanity and non-exculpatory defenses like
diplomatic immunity. Now we have seen that non-exculpatory
defenses share nothing normatively in common with one another,
apart from all being defenses. By aggregating them with exculpatory
defenses, Berman makes it difficult to inquire into the very thing I
shall be investigating in part IV -- namely, whether what I call
Aexcuses@ (i.e., exculpatory defenses that are not defenses of actus reus
or justification) are derivative of a broader norm of exculpation.
III. RIVAL DEFINITIONS
AEXCUSE@

AND

NORMATIVE ACCOUNTS

OF

Numerous commentators have sought to identify what John
Gardner calls Athe gist of excuses.@77 In order to account for excuses,
commentators must first do something like what I have undertaken in
part I: they must explicitly or implicitly identify the set of defenses for
which they hope to provide accounts. Interestingly, commentators
differ widely on the kinds of defenses that qualify as Aexcuses.@ Thus,
Gardner defines excuses in such a way as to exclude defenses of
insanity, immaturity, and involuntariness, which he regards instead as
defenses of Alack of responsibility.@78 Others define excuses to include
such defenses without being limited to them.79 And still others come
close to defining excuses to consist exclusively of the very defenses that
Gardner excludes.80
John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 575
(1998).
78
Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, pp. 587-88.
79
See, e.g., George Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 798-807.
80
See, e.g., Paul Robinson, THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL
77

38

Westen

My purpose in this part is to describe and criticize the leading
accounts of excuse. I shall be criticizing them from both internal and
external standpoints. By internal criticism I mean criticism that
accepts a commentator=s definition of Aexcuse@ but critically examines
how persuasively the commentator accounts for the normative
content of criminal defenses that thereby fall within the definition.
By external criticism I mean criticism that accepts a commentator=s
normative account of the content of what the commentator defines as
Aexcuses@ but critically examines whether the definition of excuses is
under-inclusive or over-inclusive. To illustrate what I mean by such
external criticism, consider the defense of duress. Commentators
commonly classify duress as an excuse, in contradistinction to
necessity and self-defense which they classify as justifications. Yet we
have seen that duress, necessity, and self-defense all share the same
essential features: they are all choice-of-evil defenses that are valid if,
and only if, the evils chosen are normatively proportional to the evils
avoided. To be sure, commentators argue that duress is distinctive
because victims of duress sometimes make panicked choices that they
would not make if they were cool and collected. But of course the
same thing can happen to victims of necessity and self-defense, and
when it does, the latter are judged by the standards of persons in their
stressful Asituations@ without altering the way necessity and selfdefense are classified. Some commentators also claim that the
defense of duress is distinctive in that it allows actors to do the wrong
thing when the average person, when confronted with the same hard
choice, would also do the wrong.81 However, we have seen that that
is not so. Actors under duress are judged by the standards of persons
of Areasonable@ resolution, Areasonableness@ being a normative
measure of the steadfastness and respect of for others that the law can
rightly expect of people, not an empirical measure of the way people
LAW 81-83.
81
See, e.g., Kadish, Excusing Crime, at 265, 274 (arguing that an actor is
excused for making a wrong choice under duress and that he is excused because,
"though he breached a legal norm, he acted in circumstances so constraining
that most people would have done the same," and, hence, "the person has not
shown himself to be more blameable than the rest of us").
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typically behave. As a consequence, any theory of excuse that
classifies duress as an excuse is subject to external criticism on the
ground that it is either over-inclusive in including duress as an excuse
or under-inclusive in excluding necessity and self-defense as excuses.
A. The Character Theory of Excuses.
The character theory of excuses is a function of a broader,
character theory of blameworthiness often attributed to David
Hume.82 According to Hume, a person who performs a wrongful act
is blameworthy if, and only if, his conduct manifests bad character on
his part -- that is, if, and only if, his conduct reveals him to possess a
settled disposition to disregard the legitimate interests of others.83 It
follows, therefore, that a person who performs a wrongful act has an
excuse if, inter alia, (1) he made reasonable and good faith mistake
consistent with his being of good character, (2) he was compelled by
pressures over which he had no control (other that the pressures of
settled character), (3) he was too young to have developed a settled
character, (4) he acted from insanity rather than any settled character
on his part, or (5) his conduct was out of character for him.84
The character theory of excuses has a great many strengths, in
addition to its Humean pedigree. The theory is revealing of
culpability, because Hume=s account of when actors ought to be
excused from blame (i.e., when their wrongful conduct does not
See Michael Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 5 LAW
5 (1982).
83
David Hume, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 10002 (Henry Regnery ed., 1965).
84
For exponents of character theory, see Peter Arenella, Character, Choice
and Moral Agency, in E. F. Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr. & J. Paul, eds., CRIME,
CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 59, at 67-68 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Richard
Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, in J. PENNOCK AND J. CHAPMAN, EDS.,
NOMOS: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 165 (New York: New York University, 1985);
George Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 799-802; Nicola Lacey, STATE
PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 67-78 (1988);
Victor Tadros, The Characters of Excuse, 21 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 495 (2001);
and George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661
(1987).. For powerful criticism of character theory, see Antony Duff, Choice,
Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 345, 361-70 (1993).
82
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manifest bad character on their part) is a direct function of Hume=s
account of when actors are deserving of blame (i.e., when their
wrongful conduct is a manifestation of bad character on their part).
The theory also fares well under external critique because its
definition of Aexcuses@ comes into play only with respect to actors
who have engaged in conduct that the state regards as regrettable or
undesirable, and with respect to them, the definition of excuses is coextensive with the entirety of their exculpatory defenses.
The character theory of excuses nevertheless presents at least
two internal problems. First, the theory accepts as an excuse what
the criminal law universally rejects as a defense, namely, the claim by
a wrongdoer that his conduct was Aout of character@ for him. The
character theory accepts such claims as an excuse because conduct
that is out of character for an actor manifests no character of his at
all, much less bad character, and, hence, provides no basis for blame.
In contrast, the criminal law rejects such claims, at least when
proffered as complete defenses to wrongdoing. Suppose, for example,
that a man with a sterling and seemingly deserved reputation for
honesty acts on impulse and steals petty cash from his employer. The
fact that the theft is an exceptional lapse from otherwise good
character may constitute a partial defense for the man by virtue of
mitigating his punishment. Thus, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
permit judges in certain cases to reduce the sentences of defendants
whose impulsive conduct Arepresents a marked deviation . . . from an
otherwise law-abiding life.@85 But the fact that wrongful conduct is an
exceptional lapse of otherwise good character provides no basis in law
for exculpating an actor altogether.
Now one might try to resolve the foregoing problem by linking
character to conduct. The argument would go as follows: AIt is a
fallacy to conceive of >character= as existing independently of conduct.
A person=s character is constituted by the attitude toward others that
he exhibits in the totality of his conduct toward them, including
conduct that departs from what his past behavior leads observers to
predict. Thus, an employee who acts on impulse to steal only once
85

18 U.S.C.S. Appendix ' 5K2.20 (2004)(Aberrant Behavior).
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exhibits less bad character than an employee who plans his theft in
advance or who steals many times. But the former employee=s
wrongful conduct nevertheless exhibits bad character on his part
because it reveals him to be a person who, when the impulse arises, is
willing to steal once from his employer. And because his wrongful
conduct exhibits bad character on his part, he deserves to be blamed
for it, albeit perhaps less than wrongdoers who reveal themselves to be
inveterate thieves.@86
This redefinition of Acharacter@ may resolve the first problem
in the character theory of excuses, but it does not address the second
problem. The second problem is that the theory rejects as an excuse
what the criminal law typically accepts as a defense -- namely, a claim
by a mentally-ill actor with chronic paranoia that because of his
chronic mental illness, he did not know what he was doing when he
killed an innocent victim in the mistaken belief that the latter was
trying to kill him. Now I have said that the character theory excuses
actors whose wrongful conduct is a product of intermittent mental
illness rather than character. But it does not excuse a mentally ill
actor whose wrongful conduct is a product of chronic paranoia that
has become his character, because his conduct is then as much a
manifestation of his character as anyone=s. Nor, under the revised
theory stated above, does the character theory excuse an actor whose
wrongdoing is the product of aberrant bouts of mental illness that are
out of character for him, given that Acharacter@ under the revised
view is constituted as much by aberrant acts as by predictable acts.
To be sure, one could try to supplement character theory by
adding that a person ought not to be blamed for manifestations of
character over which he has no control. But that raises problems of its
own. For one thing, it would not satisfy Hume and other like-minded
Acompatibilists;@ for Hume was a determinist who believed that no
one has control over the character he possesses, and, hence, lack of
control over character cannot itself be exculpating.87 More serious
Cf. Antony Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 345, 371-80 (1993). For criticism of this move to vindicate
character theory, see Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, pp. 581-85.
87
See David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding 95, 104
86
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still, if lack of Acontrol@ excuses a person for conduct that stems from
character, it must be because lack of control excuses generally,
regardless of character. In that event, however, lack of control
operates not as a supplement to a character theory of excuses but as
an independent rival to a character theory of excuses.
B. The Choice Theory of Excuses.
H.L.A. Hart published a series of celebrated essays between
1957 and 1967, expounding what has since become known as the
Achoice@ theory of criminal excuses.88 Like others who seek to
account for criminal excuses, Hart begins by identifying which legal
defenses he means to include within excuse. Excuse,@ Hart says,
comes into play after actors otherwise commit criminal wrongs, and it
exculpates actors on the basis of certain Amental conditions,@
including, he says, accidents, mistakes of law and fact, insanity,
immaturity, involuntariness, and duress.89 Interestingly, however, in
the course Hart=s 10-year effort to account for such excuses, he frames
it in two slightly but significantly different ways. Sometimes Hart
argues that actors are, and ought to be, excused from criminal
conduct that they do not Achoose.@90 At other times, Hart argues that
actors are, and ought to be, excused from criminal conduct that they
lack Acapacity and a fair opportunity to choose@ to avoid.91 These two
formulations of the theory have influenced commentators, some of
whom embrace Achoice@ as the rationale of excuses,92 and others of
whom embrace Acapacity and fair opportunity to choose.@93 I shall
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955)(originally 1743).
88
See H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW vii-viii, 21-24, 28-53, 181-83, 227-30 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1968).
89
See H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28, 229.
90
H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 44-45, 49.
91
H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 23.
92
See Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, pp. 574-88; Kadish, Excusing
Crime, p. 259.
93
See Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New
Excuses, and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 701-02(1988); Hyman
Gross, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 137 (New York: Oxford University
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address these two formulations of choice theory and criticize each of
them on internal grounds.94 I shall also criticize on external grounds
commentators who accept the choice theory of excuses but exclude as
Aexcuses@ certain defenses that Hart includes, namely, defenses of
mistake of fact and law regarding the elements of offenses.
1. Absence of Choice
In his 1957 ALegal Responsibility and Excuses,@ Hart derives
excuse from what he asserts to be the nature of the criminal law itself.
Criminal law, he says, is a Achoosing system.@ It specifies the harms
and risks it wishes people to avoid, and it gives people Areasons@ to
avoid them by girding them with Acosts.@ But criminal law ultimately
leaves it to people Ato choose@95 what to do. Accordingly, he says, an
actor is, and ought to be, excused from criminal conduct that he does
not Areal[ly]@ choose.96
This version of the choice theory successfully explains some
defenses. Thus, it explains why it is a defense that an actor=s conduct
was a product of epilepsy. It explains why, when a person is charged
with a crime of purpose or knowledge, it is a defense that his conduct
was the product of accident, mistake of fact, or mistake of law. And it
explains why it is a defense that a mentally-ill or involuntarily
intoxicated actor did not know what he was doing or, if he did, that
he did not know it was wrong. However, this version of the choice
theory does not account for the law=s treatment of other defenses.
The theory fails to explain why the law excuses certain actors who do
choose and refuses to excuse certain actors who do not choose.
To illustrate the law=s refusal to excuse actors from criminal
conduct that they do not choose, consider crimes of negligence.
Suppose, for example, that an actor is charged with involuntary
manslaughter based on evidence that he negligently killed another
Press, 1979); Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General
Theory, 12 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 193, 199 (1993).
94
For powerful criticism of choice theory, see Antony Duff, Choice,
Character, and Criminal Liability, pp. 350-61.
95
H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 44.
96
H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 45.
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person, say, by accidentally dropping a cocked pistol or mistakenly
believing a rifle is unloaded. An actor who accidentally or mistakenly
kills does not choose to kill. Indeed, if he chose to kill, he would be
guilty of either murder or involuntary manslaughter. Yet the law does
not regard his failure to choose to kill as a defense to involuntary
manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is precisely the offense a
person commits by killing not through choice, but through
negligence. The law also regularly inculpates actors whose voluntary
intoxication causes them to unwittingly undertake risks of which they
would be aware if they were sober.97
Now consider the converse, viz., the law=s willingness to
excuse actors from criminal conduct that they do choose. An
example is a mentally-ill actor who knows what he is doing, and
knows that it is wrong, but claims to suffer from a Acompulsion@ to do
it. Even if one assumes that compulsions of that kind prevent actors
from choosing other than they do, it does not follow that the
compulsion prevent actors from choosing what they do. On the
contrary, the claim with respect to such compulsions is precisely that
they leave actors with no alternative but to choose to do what they
do.98
2. Absence of Capacity and Fair Opportunity to Choose Otherwise
Hart shifts emphasis in his later essays. Rather than arguing
that an actor has a defense to criminal conduct, x, if he fails to choose
x, Hart argues that an actor has a defense to x if he fails to possess a
Acapacity and fair opportunity to choose@ non-x. 99The latter version of
the choice theory has several advantages over the former version.
Thus, the latter version explains why the law punishes negligence and
acts of persons who are voluntarily intoxicated. Negligent actors and
voluntarily intoxicated actors may not choose to engage in the
For a choice theorist who recognizes that choice theory is inconsistent with
the law of criminal negligence, see Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, pp.
588-90.
98
See Kadish. Cf. Dan-Cohen to the effect that a person can choose to do
what he has no choice but to do.
99
H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 23.
97
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wrongful conduct with which they are charged, but they do possess
the Acapacity and fair opportunity@ to choose to avoid such conduct
by attending more closely to what they are doing and by refraining
from intoxicating themselves. The capacity version of choice theory
also appears to explain why mentally-ill actors are excused from
knowingly committing wrongful acts that they are allegedly compelled
to commit. Such mentally-ill persons may knowingly choose to do
what they do, the argument goes, but given their compulsions, they
do not have capacity to choose otherwise.
The problem with the capacity version of choice theory is
that, although it appears to explain insanity cases based upon
compulsions, it does so by means of a question-begging metaphor.
The capacity theory is persuasive with respect to persons who lack an
opportunity to exercise their wills (e.g., persons suffering from epilepsy
or reflex actions or persons who are violently pushed) and people who
are subjected to overwhelming physically force against their will (e.g.,
persons who are carried kicking and screaming into the street and
then charged with being in a public place), because lack of Acapacity@
literally describes them: lacking an opportunity to affect their conduct
through an exercise their wills, they have no Acapacity@ to prevent
wrongful harms or risks that may occur and, hence, absent strict
liability, should not be blamed for them. The same is not true,
however, of actors who in their insanity, hypnosis or sleepwalking,
engage in complex actions that require what philosophers call
Aintentionality@ ( i.e., propositional beliefs about the world), and
choices of means toward ends (e.g., walking down stairs to get to a
woodpile, picking up an axe to use it, wielding the axe for its
purpose).100 Of course, one can say of such persons that they have no
Acapacity@ or no Asubstantial capacity@ to choose otherwise than they
choose. But with respect to conduct that presupposes intentionality
and choices of means and ends, the terms Ano capacity@ and Ano
control@ are not literal descriptions of events that can actually be
observed or experienced. They are metaphors invoked to give persons
See Michael Moore, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE
RELATIONSHIP 257 (1984); Morse, Acts, Choices, and Coercion, pp. 1642-45.
100
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who choose to inflict harms or risks in states of insanity, hypnosis, or
sleepwalking the benefit of the same kind of exculpation enjoyed by
persons who lack an opportunity to make any choices at all.101 They
are metaphors because neither science nor forensics knows of any way
to determine that an actor who intentionally chooses to do something
could not have chosen otherwise.102
To be sure, the fact that a theory speaks in metaphors does
not prevent it from having explanatory force, provided that its use of
metaphor is perspicuous -- that is, provided that the features that
trigger the metaphor are evident and normatively compelling. The
principal internal problem with the capacity theory of excuses is a lack
of perspicuousness. The features that are supposed to trigger the
metaphors of Ano capacity@ may be evident with respect to some
varieties of disordered agency (e.g., hypnosis and somnambulism), but
they are highly occluded in others. And because they are occluded,
they deprive the theory of explanatory power. The theory purports to
explain when actors are, and are not, excused from blame. But
because the theory refers to the conditions of blamelessness only
obliquely rather than directly, it obfuscates what it purports to
clarify.103
A good example are the legal defenses that most closely
appropriate the language of capacity theory, namely, so-called
Avolitional@ tests of insanity.
Nearly all Anglo-American
For a powerful statement of this thesis, see Stephen Morse, Acts, Choices,
and Coercion: Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1591-92 (1994).
See also Sanford Kadish, Excusing Crime, 266 (conceding that invoking lack of
Achoice@ in such cases is Ametaphorical@). See also id. at 282.
102
See Morse, Acts, Choices, and Coercion, pp. 1600-01 (A[I]t is famously
the case that . . . it is impossible to differentiate >irresistible= impulses from those
simply not resisted@); Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 281 (Athere is no way objectively to
establish that a person could not refrain from a criminal action, rather than would
not@).
101

Cf. Morse, Acts, Choices, and Coercion, p. 1610 (arguing that Anotions of
loss of control are almost always parasitic upon other justifications for excuse and
that the notion of loss of control unduly threatens to mislead or confuse
legislators, criminal justice system participants, and the public@).
103
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jurisdictions possess criminal defenses of insanity that are defined in
Acognitive@ terms; that is, they are defenses like the rule in
M=Naghten that consist of the claim that by virtue of mental illness,
the defendant did not know what he was doing or, if he did, he did
not know it was wrong. In addition, however, many jurisdictions
superimpose defenses of insanity that are defined in Avolitional@ terms.
Volitional defenses of insanity consist of the claim, >The defendant
may have known what he was doing, but being mentally ill, he lacked
capacity to control himself=. The Airresistible impulse@ defense of
insanity is a volitional defense of criminal insanity.104 So, too, is the
second part of Model Penal Code section 4.01, which provides a
defense to a mentally-ill actor who, though he may have known what
he was doing and may have known that it was wrong, nevertheless
lacked Asubstantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.@ Volitional tests of insanity are designed to
exculpate mentally-ill persons who do not obviously qualify for
cognitional defenses of insanity like M=Naghten and, yet, suffer from
compulsive and disordered thinking that tends to evoke pity rather
than indignation and reproach. Mark Bechard was such a person.105

See e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 72 (D.C. Ct. of App.
1976); Washington v. Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d 789, 798, 659 P.2d 488, 494 (1983).
105
See Bangor Daily News, October 17, 1996; Bangor Daily News, October
10, 1996; Portland Press Herald, October 8, 1996; Portland Press Herald
(Maine), October 17, 1996, page 1A; Portland Press Herald (Maine),
October 12, 1996, page 1A; Portland Press Herald (Maine), October 11, 1996,
page 1A.
104

48

Westen
Mark Bechard and the Sisters
Bechard was 38 on January, 1996, when he attacked a
group of elderly nuns from the Sisters of the Blessed
Sacrament Convent in Waterville, Maine, who had
recently become a source of solace and comfort for
him. By then he had already had a twenty-year
history of hallucinations, mood swings, and delusions
of persecution regarding political figures, entertainers
and strangers. Beginning when he was 10 years old,
he was plagued with severe headaches and began
having difficulty sleeping. By the time he was a high
school junior, he felt he was being persecuted by his
friends. After a single semester at college, he returned
home, saying that he began getting Adark moods@ and
not sleeping for days at a time. He told his mother
that voices in his head were always there, always
talking to him, and he felt an obligation to follow their
directions. The next year he was hospitalized a dozen
times. Over the following 20 years, he was an
outpatient at a half-dozen mental institutions. He was
placed on medication which seemed to work for
several years; but by January, his mother said, "The
voices were getting louder and he was losing control."
He had always been religious, and he walked barefoot
one year from Waterville to Bangor, Maine, to bring
the priest a message of "repentance" that he said God
was telling him in his head. He had hoped to become
a priest, but was beginning to despair that he would
not stay healthy enough to fulfill his felt vocation. In
the six months before the event, he spent increasing
time at the Convent, where he enjoyed praying with
the nuns.
Bechard awoke on January 27 in a particularly dark
mood, aggravated, perhaps, by his having stopped his
medication. "His face was black," his mother later
said, Ahe didn't have any eyes at all -- they were just all
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black. Things were coming out his mouth but it was
not any language. It wasn't French; it wasn't English."
He took his trumpet and trombone B possessions, his
mother said, that Agave him his identity@ B and threw
them in the trash and left the house in a cold and
driving rain storm, dressed in nothing but pants and a
T-shirt. His mother called the emergency mentalhealth hotline, but the telephone lines were down
because of the storm and no one answered.
Meanwhile, Bechard walked to the convent where he
sat in a pew, drenched and sobbing, his head jerking
back and forth, and breathing heavily. During the
Prayer of the Faithful, when the usual response of the
congregation is "Lord, hear our prayer," Bechard
would say: "May God thwart the path of the evil one."
The nuns, though aware of his mental illness, were
accustomed to his being well-dressed and cleanshaven. Alarmed by his appearance and bizarre
behavior, they worried that he might be high on
drugs. When he asked to speak to a priest, the nuns
pretended to direct him to the rectory but instead
directed him to the outside and locked the door.
Upon being shut out, he first began sobbing, jerking
his head, and taking in loud gulps of air. Then he
proceeded to the kitchen door, broke the glass of the
door, unlocked it from inside, and entered on a
rampage. He killed his first victim, 67 year-old Sister
Marie Fortin, by knocking her to the ground and
repeatedly stomped on her face. He killed his next
victim, 68 year-old Sister Edna Cardozo, by beating
her about the face and stabbing with a kitchen knife
that he left protruding from her cheek. He found his
next victim, 69 year-old Sister Patricia Keane in the
chapel, where she was praying. He grabbed Sister
Keane=s metal walking cane and struck her three times
on the head until it broke, whereupon he seized a

50

Westen
statue of the Blessed Virgin and despite her
exclamations of ANo, don=t do that,@ he hit her with it.
He was poised to hit her again with it when a
policeman entered and ordered him to Afreeze.@ He
immediately put the statue down and lay down on the
floor.
Bechard=s bizarre behavior continued at the police
station. His mood changed rapidly and repeatedly
from being repentant to having hallucinations. He
would go from being very calm one minute to, as one
officer described it, Atrying to dig his eye out with his
toes.@ He slammed his face into the floor. He talked
to himself. He shouted at people who were not there.
He seemed to be Ayell[ing] at himself from inside
himself,@ one officer said, shouting, "Go, Mark, go.@
"Why, Mark? Why?" "Now look what you did. Don't
do it! Don't do it!" Bechard later told psychologists
that mysterious voices told him to go to the convent
and get "cat smut" in order to save the "Pixie."
Characters he called "the abusifier" and the "votese"
told him to execute the nuns, he said. But when he
was asked why he killed the nuns, Bechard replied: "I
don't know why. I loved them."

Bechard is not one whom the cognitive test of M=Naghten is a
felicitous fit.106 After all, Bechard must have known that he was
striking defenseless nuns because he proceeded methodically from one
defenseless nun to another, despite their pleas for mercy. And he
must have known that striking them was wrong because he claimed
This is not to say that Bechard could never be acquitted under a
traditional M=Naghten rule of insanity. Obviously, a judge in a jurisdiction bound
by M=Naghten could instruct a jury on insanity in a case like Bechard=s on the
ground that the jury might reasonably find that Bechard did not really know what
he doing. Rather, the point is that within a jurisdiction that views claims of
insanity with skepticism and, following the Hinckley verdict, construes
M=Naghten narrowly, it is a hurdle to say of Bechard that he did not know that he
was killing and did not know that killing was wrong.
106
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to be acting not on behalf of God or an oracle of goodness but on
behalf of the Aabusifier.@ Moreover, the trial judge did not acquit
Bechard on the ground that Bechard did not know he was acting
wrongly. The trial judge acquitted Bechard in the language of the
capacity theory of excuses. He acquitted Bechard on the ground that,
by virtue of his mental illness, Bechard Alacked even the most basic
control to stop himself.@107
Many observers, I suspect, will agree with the judge that
because of Bechard=s particular kind of disordered thinking, Bechard
was more to be pitied than condemned. And because they agree with
the result the judge reached, they may look favorably on the language
of Acontrol@ in which the judge framed his decision. But it is
important to recognize that when the judge concluded that Bechard
could not Acontrol . . . himself,@ the judge was not describing
phenomena that can be scientifically observed. For there are no
scientific criteria to ascertain when a person who chooses to do one
thing could not have chosen otherwise -- no way to know that
Bechard could not have stopped when the nuns begged for mercy, just
as he immediately stopped when the policeman ordered him to
Afreeze.@ Rather, when the judge concluded that Bechard Alacked
control to stop,@ he used Alack [of] control@ not as description but as a
conclusory label for certain features of Bechard=s disordered thinking
that evoked pity in observers rather than indignation.
To be
sure, if triers of fact intuitively grasp the features of disordered
thinking that the metaphor of Ano control@ is designed to capture,
volitional tests of insanity will function as they are supposed to. The
problem with volitional tests of insanity is that triers of fact do not
always understand what they are supposed to do, and when they do
not, volitional tests leave them without guidance. That was precisely
the problem that beset the jury in trying John Hinckley. Like
Bechard, Hinckley was mentally ill; and like Bechard, Hinckley knew
he was attacking persons who were no threat to his life, and Hinckley
knew what he was wrong was wrong. But in contrast to Bechard=s
compulsive and disordered thinking, Hinckley=s kind of thinking
107
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aroused indignation in most observers rather than pity.
Unfortunately, the jurors who were impaneled to try Hinckley did not
intuitively grasp the features of compulsive and disordered thinking
that the metaphor of Ano control@ is presumably designed to capture.
And because the volitional test of insanity provided them with no
explicit guidance, they ended up making a judgment of Ano control@
that so outraged the public that numerous legislatures, including
Congress, repealed the volitional test altogether.108
This is not to equate Hinckley=s mania with Bechard=s
disordered thinking for purposes of excuse. The normative differences
between the two men=s species of insanity are significant, and a
perspicuous theory of excuse would identify them.109 The point is that
volitional tests of insanity do not identify those differences. They
provide jurors with no guidance as to the normative judgments they
are supposed to be making and, by providing jurors with no such
guidance, relegate the resolution of insanity cases to a hope and
prayer.
3. Paul Robinson=s Realm of Excuses
Paul Robinson accepts Hart=s choice theory of excuses, but he
excludes from his definition of Aexcuses@ certain defenses that Hart
includes -- namely, defenses of mistake of fact and law that arise with
respect to the elements of offenses.110 In doing so, Robinson opens
himself to criticism on external grounds, that is, on the ground that
For an account of the political and legal reaction to the Hinckley verdict,
including skepticism among lawmakers about what it means to say that Hinckley
could not control himself, see Richard Bonnie, Anne Coughlin, John Jeffries, and
Peter Low, CRIMINAL LAW 540-41(New York: Foundation Press, 2004).
109
As we shall see in Part IV, the significant difference between Hinckley
and Bechard is that Hinckley can be reproached for selfish disregard for the
legitimate interests of others, because he acted for many months to bring about a
consistent, perversely rational and well-defined goal at their expense of others,
i.e., the goal of doing the most heinous thing he could imagine in order to
demonstrate to Jodie Foster the depth of his commitment and to indelibly link
his identity to hers in the world=s eyes, and because he achieved his goal. In
contrast, Bechard cannot be reproached for selfishness because neither Bechard
nor anyone else can make sense of what he hoped to achieve.
110
See note ____, supra.
108
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he excludes from his definition of excuses certain defenses that are
normatively identical to defenses that he includes as excuses.
An obvious example is the similarity between reasonable
mistakes of fact with respect to defenses of justification (which
Robinson includes within Aexcuse@) and reasonable mistakes of fact
with respect to elements of offenses (which Robinson excludes from A
excuse@). Consider two actors -- AJohn@ and AJoan.@ John, seeing a
third person, V, running toward him, kills V in the reasonable but
mistaken belief that killing V is necessary to prevent V from
wrongfully killing him. In contrast, Joan, using a theater pistol upon
a theatrical stage, kills another person, V, in the reasonable but
mistaken belief that the pistol is loaded with blanks. John and Joan
both inflict a harm that the state regrets and that the criminal law of
homicide seeks to prevent. Both act on the basis of states of mind for
which they cannot be faulted. Yet Robinson would say that John=s is
a defense of excuse, while Joan=s is a defense of lack of mens rea. By
placing the two defenses in separate categories, Robinson obscures the
fact that John=s excuse and Joan=s defense of lack of mens rea share the
same exculpatory principle in common -- namely, that a person who
inflicts a harm that the state regrets ought nevertheless to be
exculpated if his attitude was one of proper regard for the interests of
others.
Another but less obvious example is the similarity between the
M=Naghten defense of insanity (which Robinson treats as Aexcuse@)
and reasonable mistakes of fact and law with respect to elements of
offenses (which Robinson excludes from excuses).
M=Naghten
provides a defense to wrongdoers who, because of mental illness, do
not know what they are in fact doing or, alternatively, do, indeed,
know what they are in fact doing but do not know it is wrong.
M=Naghten constitutes as an Aexcuse@ under Robinson=s capacity
theory because by virtue of their mental illnesses, actors have no
capacity to know that they are doing something wrong.111 Yet
Robinson=s capacity theory excludes from the class of Aexcuses@
certain defenses that, like M=Naghten, also consist of the claim, AI
111
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didn=t know,@ namely, defenses of mistake of fact and mistake of law
that arise with respect to the elements of offenses.
Admittedly, M=Naghten contains an additional claim besides AI
didn=t know.@ It contains the claim, ABut I couldn=t help not knowing.@
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the limited role that AI
couldn=t help it@ plays in M=Naghten. After all, it does not suffice
under M=Naghten to show that a person couldn=t help but not know,
because if it did, M=Naghten would be a defense for persons who are
ignorant because of voluntarily intoxication as well as those who are
ignorant because of insanity. Nor does it suffice under M=Naghten to
show that a person could not help but know the facts of which he was
aware (as opposed to not knowing) because if it did, M=Naghten would
be a defense for persons who, perhaps because of some kind of
uncontrollable autism, are more aware of the wrongful risks they are
undertaking than other persons would be. Rather, M=Naghten is a
defense if, and only if, actors are unaware of facts or law for reasons
that were not their fault. Significantly, however, the very same
defense exists in sane persons and for precisely the same reasons. A
sane person who makes a reasonable mistake of fact or law with
respect to an offense or a justification that is not based upon strict
liability has the same defense as a mentally-ill person under
M=Naghten.112 They both have defenses if, and only if, they can claim,
AI didn=t know I was doing anything wrong, and my ignorance was not
my fault.@ The M=Naghten requirement that an actor=s ignorance be
attributable to mental illness performs the same function as the
ordinary requirement that a sane actor=s ignorance be reasonable,
namely, the function of demonstrating that the actor=s ignorance
cannot be attributed to fault on his part. In both cases, however,
what exculpates is that, for reasons that were not their fault, the sane
and insane actors did not know that they were doing anything wrong.
To appreciate the similarity between M=Naghten and ordinary
defenses of mistake of fact or law, suppose that a jurisdiction has not
yet had occasion to either adopt or reject M=Naghten. Suppose further
Cf. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, p. 185-86 (recognizing this
with respect to insane mistakes of fact but denying it with respect to insane
mistakes of law).
112

2004]

An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse

55

that the jurisdiction possesses a statute that makes it an offense to
Anegligently kill another human being.@ Suppose finally that two
homicides occur: one by a thespian, AOlivier,@ who reasonably, but
mistakenly, believes that a pistol he is handed to use on the stage is
loaded with blanks; and a mentally-ill person, ALenny,@ who strangles
a woman in the mistaken belief that he is squeezing a lemon. Olivier
will presumably be acquitted on the ground that by virtue of his
reasonable mistake of fact, he was not negligent. What about Lenny?
Obviously, Lenny=s mistake of fact would have been outlandish in a
non-psychotic person. But what about a person like Lenny who
cannot help but see lemons where others see human necks? Can
Lenny=s mistake be said to have been reasonable for an insane person
like him? If so, then Lenny will be acquitted on the same ground as
Olivier, even though the jurisdiction has not yet adopted M=Naghten.
This means that if the jurisdiction now adopts M=Naghten, it will
merely be replicating a defense that would have existed without it.
Nevertheless, if the jurisdiction now adopts M=Naghten, it will be
adopting what Robinson calls an Aexcuse@ in contradistinction to the
identical defense that would have existed without it that Robinson
would deny is an Aexcuse.@
C. Recent Theories of Excuse
John Gardner and Claire Finkelstein have each recently
advanced original theories of excuse.
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1. John Gardner=s ARole-Based@ Theory of Excuse
John Gardner has written two essays with the past decade, one
of which defines Aexcuses,@ and the other of which explores the
normative Agist@ of excuses so defined.113 AExcuses,@ as Gardner
defines them, come into play only with respect to persons who possess
the following features: (1) they are Aresponsible,@ that is, they possess
the capacity to Areason intelligibly through to action;@114 (2) they
violate the elements of criminal offenses, including actus reus and
mens rea elements alike;115 and (3) they do so under circumstances
that Gardner classifies as Aunjustified,@ viz., where the offenses are the
wrong thing to do, all things considered, or, alternatively, where the
offenses are acceptable things to do, all things considered, but where
the actors fail to act for those acceptable reasons.116 Gardner thus
excludes as excuses several defenses that Hart and others include.
Gardner excludes insanity, immaturity, sleepwalking, and hypnosis, all
on the ground that their victims are incapable of reasoning intelligibly
and, hence, in Gardner=s taxonomy, lack something that is even more
fundamental than excuse, namely, Aresponsibility.@117 And, like
Robinson, Gardner excludes accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of
law regarding the elements of offenses, all on the ground that their
victims lack mens rea and, hence, are not guilty of anything that he
believes would call for excuse.118 The exculpatory defenses that
remain are Aexcuses,@ Gardner says; and those that are full defenses
consist of these: duress, accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of law
regarding defenses of justification.
Having defined excuses, Gardner provides what he calls an
AAristotelian account@ of them. A responsible actor who commits an
unjustified offense ought nonetheless to be excused, Gardner says, if
John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 103129 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575 (1998).
114
Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 589. See also Gardner, Justifications and
Reasons, at 121-22 & n. 35.
115
See Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 120-21.
116
See Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 105, 119.
117
See Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 589.
118
See Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 120-21.
113
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given the social Arole@ or Aform of life@ the actor occupies, his
subjective thinking in committing it is Areasonable@ -- that is, his
subjective thinking manifests the Askills@ and Astandards of character@
of Acourage, carefulness, honesty, self-discipline, diligence, humanity,
good will, and so forth@ that society rightly expects of persons in his
social role.119 To illustrate, Gardner asks us to imagine two actors who
are otherwise similarly situated, one of whom is a professional
policeman and the other of whom is an ordinary citizen. Each actor
shoots and kills a victim in a hostile and stressful setting in the
mistaken belief that his respective victim is reaching for a loaded
firearm. Each actor is responsible because each is capable of
reasoning intelligibly through to action; each is guilty of the offense of
intentionally killing another person; and each commits the offense
under circumstances that are unjustified, given that, all things
considered, it is wrong to kill a person who presents no serious threat.
Whether they are Aexcused,@ Gardner says, depends upon whether
they acted reasonably; and their reasonableness, in turn, depends
upon whether they exhibited the skill in sensing threats and levelheadedness in responding to stress that society rightly expects of
policemen and ordinary citizens, respectively. Since society can
rightly expect greater skill and level-headedness of policemen than of
ordinary citizens, Gardner says, the citizen may well have a claim of
excuse that the policeman lacks.
The most notable thing about Gardner=s theory of excuses is
its singularly narrow scope. Gardner defines Aexcuse@ in such a way as
to exclude most of the defenses that intrigue commentators, including
insanity, sleepwalking, immaturity, and accident, mistake of fact, and
mistake of law regarding the elements of offenses. To be sure,
classifying defenses narrowly is appropriate if, by doing so, one
normatively accounts for defenses within the class and normatively
distinguishes defenses outside the class. But Gardner does not.
Gardner fails to account for the exculpatory nature of duress. And
like Paul Robinson before him, Gardner fails to distinguish the
Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 119 (Aform of life@), at 120
(Areasonable@); Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 587 (Arole@), 575 (Astandards of
character@); id. (Acourage . . .@).
119
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exculpatory nature of accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of law
regarding defenses of justification (which he includes within Aexcuse@)
from the exculpatory nature of accident, mistake of fact, and mistake
of law regarding elements of offenses (which he excludes from
Aexcuse@).
Having already addressed the latter failure in connection with
Robinson=s theory of excuse, I will focus on Gardner=s failure to
account for duress. Gardner=s problem with duress is this: Gardner
argues that excuse comes into play only with respect to offenses that
are unjustified; yet, given Gardner=s definition of Ajustification,@
offenses committed under duress -- as opposed to offenses committed
under mistaken duress -- ought to be regarded as offenses that are
justified. To see why, consider a case in which duress is truly an
excuse under Gardner=s definition as well as my own, namely, a case
of mistaken duress.120 Suppose, for example, that a malefactor, A,
threatens to seriously harm B unless B, in turn, does something to C
that would otherwise constitute an offense X. B reasonably but
mistakenly believes that A=s threat is genuine and does as he is
ordered, leading to his eventually being prosecuted for committing
offense X. How would Gardner analyze such a case? Gardner would
say (and rightly, I believe) that B=s offense is unjustified because
committing offense X was not actually necessary to prevent a
threatened harm.121 Gardner would also say (again rightly, I believe)
that B is excused if, and only if, B acted, not with the levels of
courage or cowardice that we statistically predict people to possess,
but with the Acourage and self-control we have a right to expect of
each other.@122 And, finally, Gardner would say (and again rightly, I
believe) that B possesses the courage and self-control that society
rightly expects when the balance between self-interest and the
interests of others upon which he acts in his mind is a balance that
society would regard as acceptable for a person in B=s social role to act
upon in actuality.123 Now consider the kinds of duress that Gardner
Westen & Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, p. 948 n. 224.
See Gardner, Justifications and Reason, at 105.
122
Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 597. See also id. at 578.
123
Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 119-20, 122.
120
121
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cannot explain, namely, instances in which everything is the same
except that B is correct in thinking that A=s threat is genuine. A
person who is correct in thinking that A=s threat is genuine is a person
who acts both in his mind and in actuality upon a balance between
self-interest and the interests of others that society regards as
acceptable, all things considered -- which is precisely the sort of
person whom Gardner has said is Ajustified.@124 And by Gardner=s own
account, a person who is justified cannot also be excused.
To be sure, Gardner=s most arresting claim is that in
determining whether to excuse an actor for mistaken justification,
the law ought to judge the actor by the higher standards of skill and
character that are appropriate to any more rigorous social role he
occupies beyond that of ordinary citizen, whether it is the role of
policeman, soldier, or doctor. For our purposes, however, it is
unnecessary to take a position on Gardner=s claim about social roles
because, rather than being an effort to account for the way the law
treats what he calls Aexcuses,@ it is a conscious effort to transform the
way the law presently treats such excuses. In any event, if Gardner=s
claim about social roles is valid, it is a claim that extends to judgments
regarding the reasonableness of all accidents and mistakes, including
accidents and mistakes regarding elements of offenses, not a claim (as
Gardner would have it) that is confined to accidents and mistakes
regarding justification.125

Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 113.
Gardner argues that with respect to judgments of excuse, actors ought to
be strictly liable for their failure to comply with the standards of the social roles
they occupy, even if they are incapable of complying, because excuses, he says,
are not designed to guide people=s conduct. Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 59697. As a defense of strict liability, the argument seems to me to be a non sequitur.
But if the argument is valid, it applies as well to judgments of reasonable
accident and mistake in connection with elements of offenses, because the
standards of mens rea that reasonable accidents and mistakes negate are not
designed to guide conduct either.
124
125
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2. Claire Finkelstein=s Theory of ARational Excuses@
Claire Finkelstein propounds a novel definition of Aexcuses@ as
well as a novel account for a certain subset of them.126 Finkelstein=s
definition of excuses is a function of her definition of Ajustification.@
An actor has a Atrue justification,@ she says, when the law regards the
commission of the actus reus of an offense a Acommendable@ thing to
do under the circumstances -- that is, when an actor is faced with a
choice of evils such that committing the actus reus produces Agreater
social good@ than foregoing it.127 Thus, she says, where several
innocent persons are mortally threatened by a culpable and wrongful
aggressor, a third party is truly justified in killing the aggressor
because given the choice between the death of innocent persons and
a culpable wrongful aggressor, the death of the aggressor is a positive
social good.128 AExcuses,@ Finkelstein says, are the exculpatory
defenses that remain when committing the actus reus of an offense is
not commendable, whether because committing the actus reus leaves
social welfare in equilibrium or because committing the actus reus
actually reduces social welfare.129
To illustrate her notion of excuses, Finkelstein asks us to
suppose an innocent actor=s life is threatened by several wrongful but
morally innocent children. The law accords the innocent actor a
defense in the event he chooses to kill the children. But, Finkelstein
says, the defense is best understood as an Aexcuse@ rather than a
Ajustification,@ because, she says, given the choice between one
innocent life (i.e., the actor=s) and several innocent lives (i.e., the
children=s) the death of several is not a greater social good.130 This
means that Finkelstein includes within Aexcuse@ all of the defenses
that Hart would include (e.g, accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of
See Claire Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. R. 317 (2003); Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57
U. PITT. L. REV. 621 (1996); Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account
of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 252 (1995).
127
Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, p. 346 (Atrue
justifications@), p. 346 (Acommendable@), p. 328 (Agreater social good@).
128
See Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, pp. 642-43.
129
Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, p. 351, 354.
130
Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, pp. 330-32.
126
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law regarding elements of offenses, insanity, immaturity,
involuntariness, duress) plus some defenses that Hart regards as
justifications B namely, instances of self-defense and necessity in
which the law allows actors to choose evils despite the fact that doing
fails to produce what Finkelstein takes to be a greater social good.
Finkelstein does not purport to possess a unitary account of
all excuses, so defined. Indeed, with the exception of duress, she does
not purport to be saying anything original about any of defenses that
Hart regards as excuses. Rather, she purports to be able to account
solely for what she calls Arational excuses@ -- namely, instances of
duress, self-defense, and necessity in which the law permits
responsible and rational adults to commit offenses despite the fact
that committing them does not produce greater social good. These
are all instances, she says, in which actors are motivated by
Adispositions@ of self preservation and love of family and friends that
are socially Aadaptive,@ in that they are Adispositions an agent acquires
in pursuing his own welfare, but which generate collective gains for
members of society as a whole.@131 The reason the law allows mature
and rational adults to engage in criminal acts that do not produce
greater social good, she says, is that it Amaximizes society=s overall
welfare@132 to encourage those adaptive dispositions, even at the price
of tolerating criminal acts that themselves produce no greater social
good.
The first thing to note about Finkelstein=s approach is that it
is not a general account of excuses, even as she defines them. It is an
account of a mere subset of those excuses. Finkelstein=s analysis of
adaptive dispositions has nothing to say about defenses of accident,
mistake of fact and law, insanity, immaturity, and involuntariness.
More importantly, Finkelstein does not account for the rational
excuses she sets out to explain because she is unable to distinguish
them from what she calls Atrue justifications.@ A person has a true
justification to an offense, Finkelstein says, when its commission
produces greater social good. A person has a rational excuse to an
131
132

Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, p. 346.
Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, p. 357 n.50.
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offense, she says, when, even though commission of the offense does
not itself produce a greater social good, the combination of its
commission and its encouragement of the dispositions of self
preservation and love of family and friends that motivate its
commission do maximize overall social welfare. In the end, therefore,
Finkelstein=s accounts of rational excuses and true justifications both
come down to the same principle, namely, that an actor has a defense
to an offense when, all things considered, the actor=s conduct is
Acommendable@ in society=s eyes.
IV. AN ATTITUDINAL THEORY OF EXCUSE
The measure of a normative theory is its robustness. A robust
normative theory of criminal excuses (1) provides a persuasive and
independent normative account of a substantial range of
contemporary defenses in criminal law, (2) treats likes alike and
unalikes unalike by including as Aexcuses@ all defenses that share the
same normative principle of exculpation and by excluding all
defenses that do not, and (3)provides normative guidance to
jurisdictions that are considering adopting or modifying existing
defenses. The attitudinal theory of excuse does all these things.
Moreover, it has the added virtue that it derives criminal excuses
from their converse, i.e., criminal culpability and in doing so
illuminates the nature of criminal culpability.
I will proceed by discussing (A) the constitutive relationship
between a state=s criminal judgment of an actor for his conduct, on
the one hand, and its expressed belief that he acted with a
reprehensible attitude toward either others or himself, (B) the
normative claim that it is unjust for a state to declare that an actor
possessed a reprehensible attitude toward others or himself that he
lacked; and (C) the degree to which criminal excuses, as I defined
them in part I, derive from the latter normative claim.
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A. The Constitutive Relationship between a State=s Criminal
Judgment of An Actor and Its Expressed Belief that He Acted with A
Reprehensible Attitude
The relationship between a state=s criminal judgments of
actors for their conduct and the state=s expression that they acted
with certain reprehensible attitudes is constitutive: by publicly
declaring an actor to be guilty of a criminal offense, the state
expresses indignation at what he has done; and by expressing
indignation, the state expresses its belief that he acted with a certain
disparaging attitude toward what the criminal statute at hand declares
to be the legitimate interests of persons, including himself.
To unpack this constitutive relationship between criminal
judgments and attitude, let us start with the sentiment of
resentment. Resentment is a sensation that a person experiences.
However, in contrast to sensations of thirst and indigestion,
resentment is also an emotion. And being an emotion, resentment is
cognitive in origin, that is, it is a sensation a person experiences by
virtue of believing that certain conditions obtain. One can
experience thirst or indigestion without believing that particular
conditions exist. But one cannot experience jealousy, envy,
resentment or other emotion without first believing that something is
true.133 Resentment is a Areactive@ emotion because it arises in A in
reaction to certain beliefs on his part about the attitude that another,
B=s, conduct manifests toward A himself: resentment is the emotion
that A experiences when he believes that B has sought to aggrandize
or indulge himself at A=s expense by engaging in conduct that
manifests an disparaging attitude on B=s part toward what A regards
as his own legitimate interests, whether the disparaging attitude
consists of malice, contempt, indifference, disregard, or neglect.134
See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Mercy, in FORGIVENESS
54 & n.14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Dan
Kahan and Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotions in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 282-84 (1996).
134
See Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in Gary Watson, ed., FREE
WILL 59, 62-66 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)(Areactive@); Jean
Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Hatred, supra note ___, at 43-45, 54; Jean
133
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To illustrate, consider Oliver Wendell Holmes=s observation
that Aeven a dog distinguishes between being kicked and being
stumbled over.@135 The dog experiences the kick as painful, regardless
of the attitude that motivated it. But the dog resents the pain only if
the dog believes that the kick was the product of malice, contempt, or
disregard. Much the same is true of people. A person who is struck
from behind may be filled with immediate anger, based on the
assumption that the blow is the product of another=s malice or
carelessness. But as soon as the injured person discovers that the
individual who struck him is blind and helpless. His person=s
resentment abates not because he thinks he shouldn=t be resentful,
but because he cannot be resentful once he no longer believes that the
blow originated in a disregard of his legitimate interests.
To be sure, the scope of a person=s resentment depends upon
the scope of what he assesses his legitimate interests to be. A person
with an exaggerated sense of self-importance will take offense where
more a modest person would not. Regardless of whether the
community at large agrees with individuals about their selfimportance, however, resentment functions as a normative sentiment
because it rests upon an assessment of what a person believes to be
the legitimate relationship between his self-interest and the interests
of others.136
As I have said, resentment is the emotion a person, A, feels in
reaction to what he believes to be B=s selfish efforts to indulge B
himself at A=s personal expense. However, A can experience a similar
emotion of indignation at what he believes to be the indignity that B
Hampton, The Retributive Idea, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 124-25. See generally
Antony Duff, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT 39-40 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986); T.M. Scanlon, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 26872 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); R. Jay Wallace,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 66-67, 74-75, 76-77.
135
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 13 (Boston: Little,
Brown, & Co., 1881).
136
See Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY 18 (Cambridge: Cambirdge University Press, 19888); R. Jay Wallace,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 33-39 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1984).
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inflicts upon a third party, C, or even at an indignity that B inflicts
upon B himself.137 Thus, a person can be indignant at the abusive
way a teenager treats his parents, or indignant at the way a teenager
mutilates or abuses her own body, feeling that the teenager manifests
a lack of appropriate dignity toward her parents or herself. Like
resentment, indignation is a reactive emotion that is triggered by A=s
belief regarding B=s failure to accord a person, including B himself, the
dignity that A believes the person deserves; and, hence, the scope of
A=s indignation is a function of what A assesses to be the dignity that
persons deserve. A=s assessment of the dignity that others deserve
may or may not reflect the standards of the community at large. Like
resentment, however, indignation remains a normative sentiment
because it rests on an assessment of what the indignant person
believes to be the legitimate interests of persons.
A criminal judge who convicts and sentences a defendant
does three things --of which the second is the most significant for our
purposes: (1) the judge adjudges the defendant to have engaged in
conduct that the state declares to be regrettable or otherwise
undesirable; (2) the judge reproaches or condemns the defendant by
expressing society=s collective indignation at him for his conduct; and
(3) the judge typically imposes upon the defendant some form of hard
treatment that the judge explicitly or implicitly declares the defendant
to deserve by virtue of defendant=s being a proper object of reproach.
Now perhaps one can imagine a regime in which judges do only the
first and neither express society=s collective indignation at defendants
nor impose hard treatment upon them by virtue of their deserving
such indignation. Barbara Wooten proposed such a scheme. She
proposed that traditional criminal law be replaced with an institution
consisting of two stages, neither of which would involve expressions of
indignation: an adjudicatory stage at which judges would determine
whether actors engaged in regrettable or undesirable conduct,
without, however, reproving or reproaching them for it; and a second
stage at which judges would determine how dangerous the actors were
137

23.

See R. Jay Wallace, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS at 18-
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and what protective or therapeutic measures, if any, would be
necessary, to prevent them from engaging in such conduct again.138
The reality, of course, is quite different. In reality, the criminal justice
system not only adjudicates the existence of wrongful conduct but
also expresses society=s collective indignation at defendants for their
wrongful conduct.139 Every criminal judgment of which I am aware is
not only an adjudication of facts but an implicit or explicit expression
of society=s normative sentiments regarding the attitudes with which
the defendant acted. Being expressions of indignation and reproach,
criminal judgments express societal sentiment that defendants sought
to aggrandize or indulge themselves by acting with malice, contempt,
indifference, disregard or neglect toward what the criminal law
regards as the legitimate interests of persons, including the interests of
defendants themselves.
B. The Normative Claim that It Is Unjust To Condemn Actors
for Possessing Reprehensible Attitudes They Lack
We have seen that to condemn a person for his conduct is to
express indignation toward him; and to express indignation is to
declare him to have engaged in the conduct with a disparaging
attitude toward the legitimate interests of persons, including, perhaps,
legitimate interests of his own. When the state condemns a
defendant for conduct that, for all the state knows, was not motivated
by disparaging attitudes toward himself and others, the state commits
two prima facie wrongs. The state wrongs the public by expressing a
falsehood, the falsehood being the state=s explicit or implicit assertion
that the defendant acted on the basis of a disparaging attitude that
For a critical discussion of Wooten=s views, see H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT
193-209.
139
Cf. Antony Duff, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT 39-40 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986); Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 264 (AIt may be
argued that . . . it is not intrinsic to judgments of criminality in our society that
they express a moral fault. But this view is surely mistaken.@); Jeffrie Murphy,
Introduction, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 8 (Apunishment may be regarded as the
institutionalization of such emotions as resentment and indignation@); Robert
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24 PACIFIC L.J. 1233, 1258-62
(1993).
138
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the state has not proven he possessed.140 Worse yet, the state wrongs
the defendant by subjecting him to what may be the greatest harm a
state can inflict on its citizens, viz., the harm of publicly declaring
that, in addition to committing a bad act, the defendant has revealed
himself to have been a bad person deserving of society=s low regard.
Indeed, it is precisely to avoid those wrongs that states typically
refrain from punishing defendants for bad acts unless states can prove
that defendants acted with attitudes of malice, contempt,
indifference, disregard, or neglect or neglect of the interests of oneself
or others. To invoke the language of the Model Penal Code, states
typically refrain from punishing defendants for bad acts unless they
can prove that defendants acted with Apurpose@ to harm themselves
or others, Aknowledge@ that they are harming themselves or others, or
Aextreme indifference,@ Arecklessness@ or Anegligence@ regarding the
legitimate interests of themselves or others. Indeed, that is what
commentators mean when they say that states typically inflict Amoral
blame@ only upon defendants who have revealed themselves to be
morally Ablameworthy.@141 They mean that states typically represent
defendants to have been bad persons by virtue of the attitudes with
which they acted only if states prove them to have been bad persons
by virtue of the attitudes with which they acted.
This is not to deny the existence of strict liability in criminal
law. Some states hold criminal defendants strictly liable for certain
offenses, regardless of the attitudes with which the defendants may
have acted. Nevertheless, most commentators regard strict liability
as unjust, particularly with respect to major offenses carrying serious
penalties.142 And commentators do so precisely because of the
Cf. Sanford Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 264 (ATo blame a person is to
express a moral criticism, and if the person's action does not deserve criticism,
blaming him is a kind of falsehood@); Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other
267 (A[T]he condemnatory aspect of punishment is subject to a further
requirement: the condemnation must be appropriate. What triggers this
requirement is not the unpleasantness of the condemnation, but the content of the
judgment expressed.
141
See, e.g., Kadish, Excusing Crime, pp. 257, 282.
142
See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 168-69 (3d ed.,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Peter Cane, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW
140
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normative claim that it is unjust for the state to reproach defendants
(and, thereby, express the belief that they acted with bad attitudes
with respect to interests the criminal law protects), unless the state
proves that defendants did, indeed, act with those bad attitudes.143
C. The Degree to Which Criminal Excuses Derive from the
Aforementioned Normative Claim
Excuses, as I defined them in part I, consist of all exculpatory
defenses in criminal law other than the absence of actus reus and the
existence of justification. Excuses thus include (1) instances in which
conduct is not the product of a person=s will; (2) instances of
accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of law regarding either the
elements of offenses or the elements of justification; (3) immaturity;
(4) lack of cognition due to insanity or involuntary intoxication;
(5)fugue states of automatism, such as hypnosis and sleepwalking;
and (6) lack of volition due to insanity or involuntary intoxication.
Significantly, these are precisely the defenses that a jurisdiction would
adopt if it used criminal sanctions to express public reproach (as all
jurisdictions do), and if the jurisdiction regarded it as unjust to
reproach defendants for having acted with reprehensible attitudes
toward themselves or others that the defendants did not possess. This
is so because each of these six conditions precludes actors from
AND MORALITY 109-10 (Oxford: Hart Publishing,, 2002); Antony Duff, Strict
Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence, manuscript on file
with ______, text accompanying note 19; Douglas Husak and Richard Singer,
Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert
Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 859, 860 (1999); Sanford H. Kadish, BLAME AND
PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 89-91 (1987); Andrew Simester &
Robert Sullivan, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE 173-74 (Oxford: Hart
Publishing,, 2000).
143
Critics of character theory argue that it cannot account for the fact that
he criminal law punishes certain actors whom society regards as possessing good
character, such as a compassionate wife who helps her suffering and terminally ill
husband end his life. See Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law,
p. 338. The latter critique is inapposite to attitudinal theory. The measure of an
actor=s attitude for purposes of attitudinal theory is the respect or lack of respect
that his act manifests, not for moral interests in general, but for the interests that
the criminal statute at hand seeks to safeguard.
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possessing the reprehensible attitudes toward themselves or others
that official condemnation represents defendants to have possessed.
1. Conduct That Is Not the Product of Will
It is a defense in most jurisdictions that a crime occurred
because the defendant was physically pushed or pulled or carried by
another person, or that he was the victim of a reflex action or of
epilepsy.144 Now it is sometimes said that the reason such absences of
will are defenses is that, rather than negating mens rea on a
defendant=s part, these conditions negate the existence of any act on
his part, much less a bad act.145 I think it is misleading to
conceptualize these defenses in terms of acts. For one thing, framing
the defense in terms of acts implies that the defendant is not a but/for
cause of harms or risks that the state seeks to prevent; while in reality
the state regrets automobile fatalities by epilepsy fully as much as auto
fatalities by speeding. Furthermore, framing the defense in terms of
acts implies that an actor cannot be blamed for it, regardless of his
culpability in allowing himself to fall prey to such interventions; while
in reality an actor such as an epileptic who culpably places himself in
a setting in which epilepsy endangers others is culpable for the harms
that result from epileptic attacks.146
Instead, as Paul Robinson observes, it is more perspicuous to
regard instances of absence of will as excuses.147 A person who is the
but/for cause of a harm or risk that the state regards as regrettable is
one who satisfies the actus reus elements of the offense at issue. The
reason that victims of pushing or pulling, victims of reflex actions,
and victims of epilepsy are exonerated is that they are excused of
responsibility for elements of actus reus they cause. Attitudinal
accounts of excuse explain why they are excused -- and why,
See Model Penal Code ' 2.01.
See generally Michael Moore, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993).
146
See Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One=s Own Defense, 71
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1 (1985).
147
Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW at 35-38.
144
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moreover, they are the clearest candidates for exculpation: persons
whose conduct is the product of an entire absence of will are persons
who lack a disparaging attitude toward the legitimate interests of
others or themselves because, entirely lacking in will, they possess no
instrumental attitudes at all.
2. Accident, Mistake of Fact, and Mistake of Law
Reasonable accidents and reasonable mistakes of fact
regarding elements of offenses are invariably defenses to all but strictliability offenses; and reasonable accidents and mistakes of fact
regarding elements of justification are nearly always defenses, too. In
contrast, reasonable mistakes of law regarding elements of offenses
and the elements of justification are less often defenses, because
criminal law typically presumes that all mistakes of law are
unreasonable, despite evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless,
commentators are increasingly of the view that actors ought to be
exonerated when they commit mala prohibita offenses by virtue of
mistakes of law that even conscientious persons would make.148 An
attitudinal account of excuses explains why these defenses exist and
why commentators advocate enlarging the defense of mistake of law.
A person makes a mistake of fact when, although he is aware of what
the state regards as wrongful conduct, he is unaware that he is in fact
doing such a thing. A person makes a mistake of law when, although
he is aware of what he is in fact doing, he is unaware that the state
regards the doing of such things as wrong. Normatively, an actor
who commits the actus reus of an offense because of a reasonable
mistake of law is just as blameless as an actor who does so because of a
reasonable mistake of fact: for neither of them knows or has reason
to know that he is doing anything that society regards as wrong and,
hence, neither of them acts with an attitude of disregard nor neglect
See, e.g., Douglas Husak & Andrew von Hirsch, Culpability and Mistake of
Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 157 (John Gardner, Jeremy
Horder, and Stephen Shute. eds., 1993); John Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and
Official Interpretations of Law, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 5-36 (1997); Stephen
Garvey, The Moral Emotions in Criminal Law, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 145, 149
(2003).
148
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for what the statute declares to be the legitimate interests of
themselves or others.
An attitudinal theory also explains why all accidents and
mistakes, even those that are unreasonable, are defenses to offenses
predicated upon mental states of purpose, knowledge or intention.
When the state punishes a person for a crime of purpose, knowledge,
or intention, it condemns him not only for committing the actus reus
but also for doing so with an attitude of a certain kind, namely, an
attitude of self-aggrandizing malice or contempt toward the legitimate
interests of himself or others. A person who commits the actus reus
accidentally or by mistake lacks those disparaging attitudes. Just as it
is both false and unjust to condemn a person for possessing some
disparaging attitude when he lacks any such attitude, it is equally false
and unjust to condemn a person for possessing a specific disparaging
attitude when he lacks that attitude.
3. Immaturity
Childhood and youth are universally defenses to the most
heinous of offenses. The reason that children possess such defenses is
not that they are entirely unaware of what they are doing or that it is
wrong. On the contrary, children can typically recount what they
have done in words that are not very different from the words of the
criminal law; and children typically realize they are doing something
wrong, particularly with respect to serious offenses. What children
are too immature and inexperienced to understand, and, indeed, what
the state assumes they are incapable of understanding, is the
normative significance of the interests they infringe.149 That is,
children are incapable of understanding why people care so much
about these interests and why society regards them as worthy of
protection.150 Because children are incapable of appreciating those
See S. Asquith, Justice, Retribution and Children in A. MORRIS & H.
GILLER, EDS., PROVIDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 7, 14 (London:
Edward Arnold, 1983).
150
See Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency, in E. F. PAUL,
FRED D. MILLER JR. & J. PAUL, EDS., CRIME, CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 59, at 6768 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990):
149
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interests in the way adults do, their conduct is incapable of
manifesting disparaging attitudes toward those interests -- or, at least,
incapable of manifesting the kind of malice, contempt, indifference,
disregard and neglect that the state expresses when it punishes
criminal offenses. Children are excused because to punish them
would be to express that they possessed disparaging attitudes toward
the legitimate interests of others that they lack.151
4. Lack of Cognition Due to Insanity or Involuntary Intoxication
Nearly all jurisdictions regard it as a defense to the actus reus
of an offense that by virtue of pathological or involuntarily-induced
intoxication, an actor did not know what he was in fact doing, or if he
did know what he was in fact doing, he did not know that it was
wrong. Both defenses can be regarded as species of insanity
defenses152 -- the former for persons whose insanity tends to be
chronic and is pathological in origin, the latter for persons whose
insanity is temporary and results from involuntary intoxication. Both
defenses also possess features that distinguish them from the
previously-considered defenses of mistake of fact and mistake of law.
Nevertheless, for purposes of excuse theory, the distinctions are
superficial because the function of cognitive defenses of insanity is to
treat sane and insane persons equally with respect to the exculpatory

The six-year-old who took the toy while "knowing" it was a bad thing to do
made a practical judgment about whether the satisfaction of getting it
outweighed the risk of getting caught and punished. He has not had sufficient
time and experience to internalize moral norms as something worthy of his
respect. Nor does he have sufficient empathy and understanding for the feelings
of other human beings as separate selves that would provide him with the moral
comprehension and motivation to act on the basis of moral reasons that place
constraints on his self-interested acts.
151
Cf. Stephen Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (1997):
[I]t [is] unjust to express a negative moral reactive attitude . . . to an agent
who lacked the capacity when she breached to understand and be guided by
good, normative reason.
152
Cf. Model Penal Code ' 2.08(4), defining the defense of involuntary
intoxication in the same terms as the insanity defense of ' 4.01(1(1).
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principle that underlies the defenses of mistake of fact and mistake of
law.
To examine the normative equivalence that exists between
ordinary defenses of mistakes of fact and law and cognitive defenses of
insanity, consider a feature that distinguishes the former from the
latter, namely, the requirement that the ordinary mistakes of fact or
law be reasonable. A sane person has a complete defense of mistake
of fact or law only if his mistakes are reasonable. In contrast, an
insane person has a complete defense if he is merely mistaken about
what he is in fact doing or mistaken in thinking it is not wrong,
regardless of how unreasonable his mistakes would be in a sane
person. As previously discussed, however, the reason that even
unreasonable mistakes of fact and law are defenses for the insane is
that by virtue of being mistaken, they do not realize that they are
infringing upon the legitimate interests of others, and by virtue of
being insane, they are unable to recognize the very thing that
distinguishes them from sane persons, i.e., that their mistakes are
unreasonable. Assume, for example, that an insane person makes the
mistake of fact of thinking that he is squeezing a lemon rather than
his spouse=s neck, or the mistake of fact of thinking that the person
whom he is killing is an imminent threat to his life rather than no
threat at all. Believing that he is squeezing a lemon or killing a lethal
and wrongful attacker, the insane person believes that he is respecting
the legitimate interests of others. And being insane, he is unable to
recognize the egregiousness of his mistake. Like a sane person who
wrongfully kills another because of a reasonable mistake of fact, an
insane person who wrongfully kills another because of an
unreasonable mistake of fact is excused because, although the insane
person commits the actus reus of killing an innocent person, he lacks
the attitudes of maliciousness, contempt, indifference, disregard, and
neglect toward the legitimate interests of others that state-imposed
blame represents offenders as possessing.
Another feature that distinguishes the ordinary defense of
mistake of law from the cognitive defense of insanity concerns the
relevance of believing that one is acting lawfully. A sane actor has a
defense of mistake of law only if he believes he is acting lawfully. In
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contrast, an insane person who believes he is acting unlawfully may
nevertheless possess a defense if he does not believe his conduct is
wrong.153 The reason that an insane person may have a defense to
conduct he knows is unlawful is that, being insane, he may not
understand what sane people invariably do, namely, that conduct that
the state regards as unlawful is conduct that the people of state also
regard as a wrong thing to do. For in his delusion, an insane person
may possess a belief that a sane person would not, viz., that even
though the people of the state regard his conduct as unlawful, they
nevertheless do not regard his conduct as a wrong thing to do.
Assume, for example, that because of his insanity, a person believes
(1) that God has directly ordered him to kill a particular person, and
(2) that the people of the state wish persons to follow God=s direct
orders when God=s order conflict with society=s laws. The insane
person knows that he is violating the law. But like the sane person
who makes a reasonable mistake of law, he lacks a bad attitude
because believes he is acting consistently with what the people of the
state regard as the legitimate interests of others under the
circumstances.154
5. Fugue States of Automatism
Hypnosis, sleepwalking, and other fugue states of automatism
are defenses in most jurisdictions. Commentators typically explain
why such conditions are defenses by classifying them with epilepsy
and reflex actions as states of Ainvoluntariness.@155 However, it is
misleading to classify automatism with instances in which persons are
entirely lacking will, because automatism involves complex, agentdirected actions in which actors perceive the world, make means/ends
See Model Penal Code ' 4.01(1)(leaving it to states to exculpate insane
persons who, though they appreciate the Acriminality@ of their conduct, do not
appreciate its Awrongfulness@).
154
He would be acting with a bad attitude if he chose to follow God=s orders
in disregard of the law while knowing full well that people of the state prefer
persons who hear orders from God to follow the law when God=s orders and the
law conflict.
155
See, e.g., Deborah Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and
Involuntary Acts 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 271 (2002).
153
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judgments about it, and act to carry out their ends.156 Consider Mrs.
Cogdon, the sleepwalker.157 While in a state of somnambulism, Mrs.
Cogdon descended the stairs of her house without falling, crossed the
yard to the woodpile where she found the axe she was seeking,
returned to the house with the axe, mounted the stairs, again without
missing a step, entered her daughter=s bedroom, and using the axe for
the purpose of chopping, struck her sleeping daughter in the head,
killing her. Mrs. Cogdon=s actions were not the reflexes of a person
entirely lacking in will. They were agent-directed actions that the
most sophisticated robots could scarcely perform. They were the
actions of a person who perceived the world, made judgments about it
with respect to her ends, and carried them out.
This is not to say that Mrs. Cogdon should not be excused for
what she did. Rather, it is to say that excusing Mrs. Cogdon on
grounds of Ainvoluntariness@ is misleading because her conduct was
the product of numerous choices, such as choosing how to hold and
wield an axe. Excusing her for not being able to Acontrol herself@ is
equally misleading because there is no way to establish that an actor
who chooses to do something could not have chosen otherwise. The
reason Mrs. Cogdon should be excused is that she performed her
actions in a profound state of dissociation from the normative
attitudes that constitute her as a person , that is, her attitudes
regarding the legitimate interests of herself and others.158
Condemning her would be unjust because it would represent her to
have possessed a certain malice or contempt for her daughter=s
legitimate interests that she lacked.159 She was as fully disconnected
from the normative attitudes of the agent who killed her daughter as
one person is disconnected from another.160 To condemn her for
See note ____, supra.
See Sanford Kadish and Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its
Processes 178 (Gaithersburg, New York: Aspen Publishers, 7th edition, 2001).
158
See Morse, Acts, Choices, and Coercion, p. 1649.
159
Robert Schopp, Multiple Personality Disorder, Accountable Agency, and
Criminal Acts,10 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 297, 309-10 (2001).
160
Students of psychology differ as to whether the diagnostic syndrome,
AMultiple Personality Disorder,@ is, indeed, a valid phenomenon. See Schopp,
Multiple Personality Disorder, Accountable Agency, and Criminal Acts, at 299-300
156
157
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what she did is analogous to condemning an unwitting actor, A, for
the harms he unwittingly inflicts upon B at C=s behest simply because
C can be proved to have acted with malice.
To be sure, a person who commits the actus reus of an offense
while under hypnosis may be culpable if he subjected himself to
hypnosis for the purpose of committing the offense, or while
indifferent to it, or neglectful of the possibility that he might commit
it. But otherwise the offense manifests the disparaging attitudes of
the hypnotist, not the person whom he hypnotizes. The same is true
of sleepwalkers, except that with sleepwalking, there is no hypnotist
and, hence, no one else to condemn.
6. Lack of Volition Due to Insanity or Involuntary Intoxication
Many jurisdictions regard it as a defense to commit the actus
reus of an offense because of pathological insanity or insanity induced
by involuntary intoxication that precludes a person from being able to
control himself. Thus, the Model Penal Code, which numerous
jurisdictions follow, provides a defense to a person who, because of
insanity or involuntary intoxication, lacks substantial capacity Ato
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.@161 These socalled Avolitional@ defenses of insanity and involuntary intoxication
are designed for persons like Mark Bechard who, though they appear
to know what they are doing and know that it is wrong, nevertheless
tend to evoke pity in observers rather than indignation.162 The
enduring question, of course, is why conduct such as Bechard=s tends
to evoke pity in observers rather than indignation. As we have seen,
it is not because Bechard could not Acontrol himself,@ because lack of
(2001). However, for the argument that in so far as MPD exists, to punish a
Ahost@ for the conduct of an Aalter@ is tantamount to punishing a person for the
conduct of another or of another over whom the former person has no control,
see Elyn Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 10 S. CAL.
INTERDIS. L.J. 185, 189-94 (2001). But see Jennifer Radden, Am I My Alter=s
Keeper?, 10 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 253 (2001).
161
Model Penal Code '' 2.08(1), 4.01(1).
162
See Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 279 (AMany defendants acquitted on
grounds of legal insanity, particularly those with psychoses, "knew" what they
were doing and "meant" to do it in a literal sense.@).
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control is a metaphor for some undefined feature of his conduct that
evokes pity. I believe that an attitudinal theory of excuse accounts
for that feature because it addresses what is most salient in
schizophrenics like Bechard.
The most salient feature of Mark Bechard=s behavior on the
day of the murders was that, being populated by cacophonous voices
that left him Ayell[ing] at himself from inside himself,@ Bechard
engaged in conduct that was profoundly irrational to everyone
involved, including himself.163 Commentators have long observed
that the hallmark of criminal insanity is Airrationality.@164 A person
acts Arationally@ when he chooses means that are plausibly designed to
advance what he regards as personal ends Bechard was able to
engage in means/ends analysis of a primitive sort, because he was able
to select means that were effective in killing his victims. Yet Bechard
found it impossible to explain to anyone, including himself, how
killing nuns whom he personally and religiously cherished could
possibly advance anything that he regarded as a personal end. When
Bechard tried to explain, he either fell into nonsense or confessed
bewilderment. He first said that mysterious voices told him to go to
the convent to get Acat smut@ to Asave the Pixie.@ He then said, AI
don=t know why [I killed the nuns]. I loved them.@
What commentators have not yet explained, however, is why
jurisdictions regard irrationality as exculpatory. Why should the
perpetrators of horrific acts like Mark Bechard=s be exculpated simply
Cf. Stephen Morse, AExcusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense
Reconsidered,@ 58 Southern California Law Review 777, 813 (1985):
We can understand that some test was originally needed to cope with cases of
crazy persons who seemed to know right from wrong, but nevertheless acted for
crazy reasons. . . . But such a person is not compelled simply because he or she
acts on the basis of a strongly held, albeit crazy, belief. Nor is the person
compelled because craziness influenced the behavior. [A]ction pursuant to a
crazy desire is no more compelled than action based on a normal desire. The
proper reason to excuse, of course, is that the person was irrational -- even
though narrowly aware of right and wrong -- not that the person was compelled.
164
See, e.g., Stephen Morse, ABrain and Blame,@ 84 Geo. L.J. 527, 539
(1996); Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 282; Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry:
Rethinking the Relationship 244-45 (1984).
163
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because their conduct appears to be profoundly irrational to everyone,
including themselves? It cannot be because punishing such actors
would not protect the public, because it would. And it cannot be
because punishing them would not deter sane actors from being
tempted to commit atrocities under the pretense of being irrational,
because, again, it would.165 It must be because something in the
irrationality they exhibit precludes observers from experiencing the
reactive emotion of indignation. I believe that it is because by virtue
of their irrationality, they lack an attitude that is a predicate to the
cognitive emotion of indignation. Indignation is the normative
emotion a person, A, experiences when he believes that another
person, B, selfishly seeks to aggrandize or indulge himself at the
expense of the legitimate interests of others. A person cannot act
selfishly to aggrandize or indulge himself without being able to make
sense of his goals. Bechard may have acted with an attitude of
contempt or even malice toward the legitimate interests of the nuns
he killed. But he cannot be seen to have acted selfishly to indulge
himself at the expense of the nuns, because he was as bewildered as
we are as to why he was doing it or what he hoped to gain from it.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago, Kent Greenawalt bemoaned what he called
the Aundevelopment of theories of justification and excuse,@ and he
urged scholars to give serious attention to the Alaudatory goal@ of
Aachieving greater clarity between justification and excuse.@166 Yet,
rather than reserving judgment until scholars had had an opportunity
to do so, Greenawalt proceeded to declare that classifying criminal
defenses by reference to justification and excuse Ais not an appropriate
[objective] for Anglo-American penal law.@167 I think Greenawalt=s
judgment was premature. Scholars have devoted a great deal of
attention to justification and excuse in the intervening years, as
Greenawalt himself urged them to. Thanks to their efforts, it is now
possible, I believe, to classify and draft criminal defenses with
See H.L.A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of
Law18-19 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).
165
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reference to the distinction between justification and excuse without
falling afoul of the problems that troubled Greenawalt.
A major barrier to conceptual clarity has been the very term
Ajustification.@ Because people tend to associate justification with its
cognate, Ajustice,@ they tend to confine Ajustification@ to conduct that
is just, rather than treat it as including all conduct that is not unjust.
How different things might have been if, instead of being framed in
terms of Ajustification@ and excuse, the issue had all along been
framed in terms of Aprivilege@ and excuse, or even Apermission@ and
excuse! A second barrier has been the tendency to assume that
justification is a function of what an actor believes he is doing rather
than what he actually does. By conceptualizing justification in terms
of an actor=s belief rather than his acts, commentators made it
impossible to distinguish justification from excuses such as accident,
mistake, and cognitive insanity. A third barrier has been the
tendency to classify the defense to which Greenawalt himself devoted
most of his attention, viz., the defense of duress, as an excuse rather
than a justification. By classifying duress with insanity and mistake of
fact rather than with self-defense and necessity, Greenawalt and
others precluded themselves from making sense of the distinction
between justification and excuse.
It is now possible to see that the distinction between
justification and excuse, properly understood, is as basic as the
distinction between absence of actus reus and absence of mens rea.
Indeed, the two distinctions reset on common principles of
exculpation. The difference between justification and excuse is as
basic and simple as the distinction between, A AI did nothing wrong,@
and AEven if I did, it was not my fault.@ Excuse thus includes
accidents, mistakes of fact and law, absence of will, automatism,
immaturity, insanity, involuntary intoxication.
One of the benefits of Adistinguish[ing] rigorously between
justification and excuse@168 is that it reveals that despite their
diversity, excuses share a single principle of exculpation in common. I
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1913, 1927.
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1913, 1927.
168
Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1903.
166
167
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argue that excuses reflect the principle that, whether or not a person
has brought about a harm or risk that the state regrets, all things
considered, it is nevertheless unjust for the state to blame him unless
he acted with an attitude of selfish or self-indulgent disregard for what
the state, speaking in its criminal statutes, regards as the legitimate
interests of persons under the circumstances, whether the attitude
consists of malice, contempt, indifference, disregard, or neglect.
Attitudinal theory, in turn, provides a norm to guide
jurisdictions in restating or reforming existing defenses. Volitional
defenses of insanity and of involuntary intoxication, for example, are
controversial in part because of skepticism about what it means to say
that a person who chooses to do something could not Acontrol
himself.@169 Attitudinal theory provides an alternative way to
conceptualize the defense, capturing what observers tend to regard as
exculpatory about certain kinds of knowing but irrational conduct by
insane and involuntarily intoxicated persons. Attitudinal theory also
suggests that the defense of mistake of law ought to be as broad as the
defense of mistake of fact. A person makes a reasonable mistake of
law when, although he knows what he is in fact doing, he does not
know and has no reason to know that the state regards such conduct
as wrongful. A person who makes a mistake of law of that sort is just
as blameless as a person who knows what the state regards as wrongful
but does not know and has no reason to know that he is in fact doing
such a thing, because both are persons who, though they may be
doing something the criminal law regards as regrettable, all things
considered, nevertheless act with attitudes of proper respect for the
legitimate interests of persons.
Finally, by virtue of illuminating the normative nature of
excuse, attitudinal theory also illuminates the normative nature of
blame. Excuse negates blame, in that it adjudges persons to be
unworthy of reproach despite the heinousness of their criminal
wrongdoing. A normative theory of excuse is an hypothesis as to the
features that render a person normatively blameless for criminal
harms or risks that he produces or the otherwise undesirable conduct
169

See note ____ supra.
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in which he engages. According to attitudinal theory, the feature
that renders persons normatively blameless -- and, typically, legally
blameless, too -- is the possession of a certain attitude with which he
engages in such wrongdoing. A person is normatively blameless for
engaging in conduct that a statute prohibits if he was motivated by
proper respect for interests that the statute seeks to protect.
Conversely, a person is normatively blameworthy for engaging in
conduct that a statute prohibits if he was motivated by an attitude of
disrespect for the interests that the statute seeks to protect, whether
the attitude consists of malice, contempt, indifference, callousness, or
inadvertence toward those interests.170

My colleague Tom Green has said in conversation although lack of a bad
attitude may justly suffice to negate blameworthiness, the presence of a bad
attitude does not necessarily suffice to attribute blameworthiness, because, in the
event all persons are pre-determined to possessed the attitudes they end up
possessing, it may be unjust to blame them for attitudes they could not help but
possess. For the argument that concerns about free will and determinism are
incoherent and, hence, no basis for further concerns or arguments about criminal
justice, see Peter Westen, The False Problem of Free Will and Determinism (in
draft).
170

